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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

The Globalization of Natural Resources:
How External Actors Affect Political Survival
in Resource Rich Countries
by
Lee, Chia-yi
Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science,
Washington University in St. Louis, 2013.
Professors Nathan Jensen and Andrew C. Sobel, Co-chairs

This dissertation examines the effect of external actors, including foreign investors, the home governments of foreign investors, and international organizations (IOs), on leadership survival in resource rich countries. According to the
existing literature, resource rich countries care less about external reputation and
have a higher level of political risks for foreign investors, so, theoretically, they
would tend to nationalize the resource sectors, especially in the presence of resource nationalism. In reality, however, resource rich countries cooperate closely
with foreign actors and join IOs that constrain themselves. This dissertation provides a theory to explain this puzzle, by modeling the interaction among foreign
actors, the leaders of resource rich countries, and the domestic opposition. It argues that leaders of resource rich countries tend to maintain a close friendship
viii

with powerful foreign countries, not only because resource rich countries have
strategic or economic importance, but also because they by nature face a higher
level of revolutionary threat. By providing support to leaders who are friends
of theirs, which depresses the opposition, foreign actors help the leaders of resource rich countries to stay in power. An empirical analysis on oil ownership
and leadership turnover shows that a leader is more likely to survive when the
oil is foreign owned. There are several foreign policy tools that foreign actors can
use to assist the leaders, including military intervention, foreign aid, and support
from IOs. Membership in IOs also has a similar effect on leadership survival,
because IOs can legitimize the leaders and cover their unpopular activities.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Oil and other natural resources, particularly strategically or economically important ones, have dramatic influence on a country’s domestic politics and economy.
On the one hand, resource rich countries benefit from resource booms by receiving large revenues that are not based on taxation. Because of these revenues, the
governments or the leaders have less incentives to engage in globalization, including inviting foreign investors, joining international organizations (IOs), and
seeking foreign aid. On the other hand, as the resource curse literature suggests,
resource rich countries tend to be exposed to some adverse effects, such as slow
economic growth, authoritarianism, and civil conflicts.
While most of the resource curse literature implicitly assumes that natural resources are state owned and that the profits are accumulated to the governments,
the extraction and production of natural resources are rarely executed completely
by a country’s own efforts. Cooperation with foreign investors is commonly seen
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in the resource sector, especially in the initial stage of resource exploration, when
foreign investment is particularly needed. Compared to non-resource rich countries, therefore, resource rich countries may actually interact more frequently with
external actors, particularly foreign investors and trade partners. How these external actors affect the domestic politics of resource rich countries, nevertheless,
is an understudied question.
Moreover, when it comes to the political resource curse, scholars tend to focus on how resource abundance or dependence affects political institutions (e.g.,
Ross, 2001; Jensen and Wantchekon, 2004; Aslaksen, 2010), or regime survival
(e.g., Smith, 2004; Ulfelder, 2007; Cuaresma, Oberhofer and Raschky, 2011; Andersen and Aslaksen, 2012; Wright, Frantz and Geddes, 2013), rather than the leader,
even though their theory usually emphasizes the leader’s ability to use resource
revenues either to provide public goods or to repress the opposition. This dissertation fills this gap by examining how foreign actors’ involvement in the resource
sector influences leaders’ survival prospects. Specifically, I argue that external
actors, including foreign investors, the home governments of foreign investors,
resource importing countries, and IOs, can help the leaders of resource rich countries to stay in power. Foreign actors can use several tools to assist the leader,
including military intervention, foreign aid provision, and support from multilateral financing organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
These forms of support are provided specifically to the leaders, which not only
can be directly used to target the opposition, but also signal to the opposition
2

foreign actors’ unwillingness to support them. The resulting outcome is that the
opposition refrains from challenging the leader, and the leader thus stays in power
longer.
This dissertation uses a multi-method approach to present and test this theory,
but the focus is on quantitative analyses. In Chapter 2, I review the literatures
that this dissertation is built upon and discuss the puzzle that is drawn from
these literatures. According to the literature on foreign direct investment (FDI)
and foreign aid, resource rich countries have a weaker motivation to engage in
globalization because they can reap the benefits from natural resource production
and do not need to eagerly seek foreign money. The FDI literature also points out
that resource industries have larger sunk costs and produce higher political risks.
These theories, along with the resource nationalist sentiment, lead to the prediction that foreign capital is more likely to be expropriated away in the resource
sector, which, however, is not what we observe in the real world. Except for the
wave of nationalization in the 1970s, most of the resource rich countries cooperate closely with foreign investors and their home governments. This dissertation
intends to explain why this is the case.
Chapter 3 introduces the core theory that explains the globalizing behavior
of resource rich countries. I show that privatizing natural resources to foreign
investors can bring in both economic and political benefits to the leader. Economically, the involvement of foreign actors enhances the efficiency of resource
extractions and assures the access to the global market, generating stable revenues
3

for the leader. Politically, the leader builds a collusive relationship with foreign investors and their home governments, both of who have strong incentives to keep
a stable resource supply, and obtain their promise of not supporting the opposition. Foreign actors also draw upon a few foreign policy tools to explicitly help
the leader and implicitly depress the opposition, including military intervention,
budgetary aid, and IMF assistance. The opposition who observes this tacit agreement between the leader and foreign actors will thus hesitate to stage a coup or
revolt. To illustrate the theory, Chapter 3 also presents a game-theoretical model
and four anecdotal cases.
Chapter 4 provides empirical analyses to test the hypotheses derived in Chapter 3. Using data on leaders and oil ownership, I show that when a country has oil
owned by foreigners, the leader is less likely to be removed. Among these foreign
powers, the United States may be the most significant one. I find that leadership turnover is less frequent in countries that receive the U.S. investment in the
mining sector and that export oil to the United States. Additional analyses also
show that countries with foreign owned oil are more likely to experience military
intervention, to receive budgetary aid, and to become IMF program recipients.
Chapter 5 focuses on IOs, examining how IO membership and resource wealth
jointly affect leadership survival. IOs may have a similar effect as foreign investors
and their home governments when they act as the agents of these powerful countries and firms. IOs, moreover, have other functions that will help a leader’s
survival, including legitimizing the leader, being a scapegoat, and shielding lead4

ers’ unpopular activities. These functions are particularly useful for resource rich
countries since they suffer from the resource curse and a higher level of revolutionary threat. An empirical analysis of IO membership, resource rents, and
leadership survival shows that IO membership has a positive effect on leadership
tenure, and that this effect is stronger for resource rich countries.
This dissertation contributes to both the international relations (IR) and the
comparative politics (CP) literatures. The theory developed in this dissertation is
compatible with traditional IR theories. The idea that foreign governments make
an effort to secure their oil interest and to support the leaders who are friends
of theirs is in line with the realists’ geopolitics and gunboat policy arguments.
The focus on how capital-intensive countries extract raw materials in resource
rich countries echos the dependency theory (Frank, 1969) and the world system
theory (Wallerstein, 1974). The consideration of the role of private companies
and IOs corresponds to the liberalist argument that non-state actors matter. This
dissertation is also built upon the CP literature that focuses on democratization,
civil conflicts, leadership survival, and resource politics. Finally, this dissertation
lies at the intersection between international and comparative political economy,
adding to the broad literature that examines the role of economic factors in affecting domestic politics.

5
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Chapter 2
Literature Review: Resource Wealth
and Foreign Actors
How do external actors affect leadership survival in resource rich countries? Before elaborating my theory, this chapter reviews the literature that is related to
and leads to the research question. I first discuss the resource curse literature,
with a focus on the political curse. I then point out two issues that are missing
in the resource curse literature and are highly relevant to this dissertation. Next,
I review the FDI literature that focuses on the resource sector, followed by a discussion on resource nationalism. Finally, I briefly review the foreign aid literature
and discuss the questions that can be drawn from this literature.

7

2.1

The Natural Resource Curse Literature

Natural resources are materials or components that are naturally present in the
environment, so basically they are the gifts from the earth. There are many ways
to classify natural resources, and a basic way is by whether this resource is renewable or not. Resources that cannot be reproduced and will be depleted are nonrenewable resources, including energy resources (such as oil and natural gas) and
mineral resources (such as gold, silver, copper, and diamonds). Resources that can
be generated again are renewable resources, such as agricultural resources, water,
sun, and wind. In this dissertation, I only consider nonrenewable resources, as
most of the resource curse literature does.1 Nonrenewable resources, especially
fuel resources, have a significant role in the industrialized world and are highly
profitable. Therefore, countries that are naturally endowed with natural resources
should benefit since these resources are “windfalls” or “manna from the heaven”
to them.
In the political science and economic literatures, however, it is largely believed
that resource endowments may not be a blessing; instead, resource abundance or
dependence may be a curse.2 This so-called “resource curse” theory shows that
natural resources may bring at least three sets of adverse effects. First, resource
1 Collier

(2010), for example, argues that only nonagricultural resources will cause the curse because they are intrinsically depletable and also because the values usually accrue to the governments.
2 It should be noted that resource abundance/wealth/richness and resource dependence are two
separate concepts which may carry different effects (Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2008a, 2009). In
this dissertation, I basically focus on resource abundance, but resource dependence is usually a
subset of resource abundance, so I also discuss the literature that emphasizes the negative effect
of resource dependence.

8

abundance or dependence may lead to slow economic growth or a lower level of
economic development, which is an economic resource curse (Sachs and Warner,
1995; Ross, 1999; Manzano and Rigobon, 2001; Manning, 2004; Isham et al., 2005;
Wick, 2008).3 Second, resource dependent countries are prone to civil wars or
regime instability (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998; Smith, 2004; Ross, 2004a,b; Fearon,
2005; Humphreys, 2005; Ross, 2006; Wick, 2008; Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2009).4
Third, resource rich countries tend to have authoritarian regimes and face difficulties democratizing (Ross, 2001; Jensen and Wantchekon, 2004; Morrison, 2007,
2009; Aslaksen, 2010; Ramsay, 2011; Tsui, 2011), which is a political resource curse.
The most relevant to this dissertation is the political resource curse, i.e, the
authoritarian effect of natural resources. As detailed in Ross (2001), resource endowments can carry an anti-democratic effect through three mechanisms. The
first is the “rentier state” effect,5 which means that states enjoying a higher level
of resource revenues can tax their people less heavily (taxation effect),6 can spend
more on buying patronage (spending effect), and can actively or passively use
the rents to prevent the formation of social groups that are likely to demand democratization (group formation effect). The second mechanism is the repression
3 There

are multiple reasons why natural resources may slow down economic growth or impede
economic development, including Dutch Disease, rent-seeking, price volatility, etc. Since this
dissertation does not focus on the economic resource curse, I do not elaborate these explanations
here. For nice reviews and summaries, see Ross (1999), Torvik (2009), and Van der Ploeg (2011).
4 The economic literature points out that civil conflicts and low economic growth are interrelated.
Civil conflicts can be one of the mechanisms through which natural resources cause the economic
resource curse (Van der Ploeg, 2011); it can also be that low economic growth caused by resource
dependence makes rebellions more likely to happen (Collier and Hoeffler, 2005).
5 The term “rentier state” is used first in Mahdavy (1970) and well defined in Beblawi and Luciani
(1987).
6 A recent study by Paler (2013) provides evidence from a field experiment that taxes motivate
people to engage in political activities, such as monitoring the government.
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effect, which is that resource wealth allows the governments to spend more on
domestic security and thus hinder population’s democratic aspirations. The third
is the modernization effect, meaning that resource wealth does not lead to social
and cultural changes that are beneficial to democratization, such as rising education levels and increasing occupational specialization, which in turn lead to a
standstill of democratization.
While most of the political resource curse literature focuses on how resource
wealth or dependence affects the level of democracy, some scholars note that the
aspect in which natural resources affect domestic politics is actually on political survival (Smith, 2004; Ulfelder, 2007; Omgba, 2009; Cuaresma, Oberhofer and
Raschky, 2011; Andersen and Aslaksen, 2012; Wright, Frantz and Geddes, 2013).
These scholars, therefore, are devoted to investigating the effect of natural resources, particularly oil, on political survival, although their definitions and operationalizations of political survival differ from one another. Smith (2004) finds
that oil wealth reduces the probability of regime failure across different regime
types. Ulfelder (2007) shows that resource rich countries are less likely to experience democratic transitions. Cuaresma, Oberhofer and Raschky (2011), Andersen
and Aslaksen (2012), and Wright, Frantz and Geddes (2013) all discover a stabilizing effect of oil in authoritarian countries, and Omgba (2009) shows that this is
true for African oil producers.
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2.2

What Is Missing in the Resource Curse Literature?

While the resource curse literature is so rich and well developed, I find there
are at least two issues that need to be explored more deeply. First, in the resource
curse literature, the role of external actors is often missing. Scholars generally focus on how resource wealth affects the interaction between domestic players, such
as two competing parties (Aslaksen and Torvik, 2006) or elites and citizens (Dunning, 2008; Morrison, 2009; Bearce and Hutnick, 2011), rather than that between
domestic and international actors. As far as I know, there are only two works
that explicitly take foreign actors into consideration. Jones Luong and Weinthal
(2006, 2010), as one of them, argue that ownership structure plays a key role in
determining whether a resource rich country is cursed. They offer a sound theory
saying that state ownership provides disincentives for governments to build institutions whereas private ownership, particularly a privatization to domestic firms,
encourages the formation of strong institutions. When foreign oil corporations are
involved, how domestic institutions are developed depends on the international
context. Specifically, they argue, facing the competition from small oil companies
and the pressure from international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and
international financial institutions (IFIs), foreign oil companies are more likely to
incorporate corporate social responsibility and favor a stable fiscal regime, which
in turn leads to partially constraining domestic institutions. Bayulgen (2010), on
the other hand, contends that FDI in the resource sector and political regimes

11

have reinforcing effects: Both autocracies and stable democracies perform better
in attracting FDI than hybrid regimes, and FDI inflows also help consolidate the
existing authoritarian/democratic rule. Except for these two works, the resource
curse literature basically has the implicit assumption that natural resources are
owned by the state and the revenues only accrue to the government, so that these
rents can be spent by the leader to coerce or coopt people.
Second, the resource curse literature has seemingly contradictory findings that
resource wealth causes regime stability as well as instability. If resource wealth
helps the leader and has a stabilizing effect, how can it lead to frequent civil wars,
which means regime instability? Scholars argue that some characteristics of natural resources matter, including the type of natural resources, the location, the
price, and the stability of the price. The first two are related to the “lootability”
of natural resources. If a natural resource requires more advanced techniques to
extract or is less accessible, such as offshore oil, its profits will be less likely to
finance or to be captured by oppositional groups, thus carrying little destabilizing effect. Andersen and Aslaksen (2012) show that resources that are hard to
appropriate, such as oil and non-lootable diamonds, are linked to longer leadership duration, but those technically more appropriable ones, such as lootable
diamonds and other mineral resources, may have a destabilizing effect. Omgba
(2009) also finds that, in Africa, only oil has a stabilizing effect for leaders, but
mineral resources do not. He provides two possible explanations, both of which
are highly relevant to the theory in this dissertation. First, oil production requires
12

more investment and techniques from abroad, and therefore this pre-financing
from foreign investors helps the leader stay in the position.7 Second, foreign governments are more likely to intervene due to the repercussion of the global oil
market, thus stabilizing the leader. Moreover, while agricultural resources are
generally excluded in the resource curse literature, some scholars, such as Isham
et al. (2005), argue that economic plants (such as coffee and cocoa) that are one
type of the “pointy” resources have a similarly adverse effect,8 because their values are more likely to be controlled by a small group of people. Humphreys
(2005) also finds that oil is not associated with civil war onset, but agricultural
value is.
Furthermore, many scholars believe that the volatility of resource prices, the
fluctuation of resource rents, or the instability of trade in resources is one of the
chief causes of the economic or political curse (Ross, 1999; Collier and Hoeffler,
2005; Dunning, 2005; Shaxson, 2005; Leong and Mohaddes, 2011). The global oil
market, particularly, has “boom and bust” cycles. Oil producing countries can
enjoy big profits when the oil price is high, but they may suffer during the bad
times, especially if they squander the oil income without saving for the future
in the good times. Therefore, a solution many scholars propose to combat the
resource curse is to diversify the economy, which reduces the overly reliance on
7 Omgba

(2009, p. 432) notes “[t]o ensure the profitability of these investments, investors are
tempted to give their supports to political leaders with which the contracts were initially negotiated, thereby reducing the risk of losing the property rights that may accompany a change in
political leadership.”
8 Pointy resources, as opposed to diffuse resources, are those that are geographically concentrated,
such as oil and plantation crops.
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the oil sector and the potential harm during the bust times (Katz et al., 2004;
Dunning, 2005; Schubert, 2006).
Some other scholars, alternatively, explore the conditional effect of natural
resources. Morrison (2012) addresses this puzzle by arguing that whether oil induces stability or conflicts is contingent on the state capacity, an argument that
Smith (2013) highly agrees with. Tsui (2010), using a formal model, shows that
whether resource wealth fuels conflicts depends on the counter-insurgent technology and whether resource wealth affects the costs of political entry deterrence.
In addition, based on the logic of Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), Dunning (2008)
argues that whether resource wealth has an authoritarian effect or democratic effect is conditional on the level of inequality, and uses this theory to explain the
case of Latin America.
In addition to the lack of external actors and the contradictory findings discussed above, some scholars point out that the resource curse studies often suffer
from an endogeneity problem because it is very likely that low economic development, frequent civil wars, or authoritarianism leads to the over reliance on natural
resources rather than the other way around (Ross, 2006; Brunnschweiler and Bulte,
2008a,b; Ramsay, 2011; Tsui, 2011). Also, it is argued that estimating the treatment
effect of resource reliance requires a counterfactual scenario, which is rarely seen
in the literature (Herb, 2005; Haber and Menaldo, 2011). These methodological
issues begin to be an important part in the resource curse literature and deserve
more attention in future studies.
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2.3

FDI in Resource Rich Countries

The previous two sections review the resource curse literature, and find that
foreign actors are rarely taken into consideration in this literature. This section,
furthermore, will review the literature on FDI and discuss how this literature
views the resource sector as a special case.
In the FDI literature, a robust and important finding is that foreign investors
prefer to enter democratic countries because governments in this type of regime
provide credible promises to honor contracts and avoid the infringement on property rights (Li and Resnick, 2003; Jensen, 2003, 2008). When the target of investment is limited to the resource sector, however, the attractiveness of democracy
no longer exists. This is because, despite a high level of political risks, the extraordinary profitability of natural resources considerably increases foreign investors’
willingness to invest in the resource sector (Kinoshita and Campos, 2003; Asiedu,
2006; Jensen and Johnston, 2011).
The classical “obsolescing bargaining model” (Vernon, 1971) predicts that the
bargaining relation between multinational corporations (MNCs) and host countries favors MNCs initially and is shifted towards host governments after MNCs
invest the initial amount of money that are unrecoverable (i.e., sunk costs). The
sunk costs in resource extractive sectors are particularly large due to high specificity, extreme irreversibility, and high concentration of employment, so in practice
it is far more likely for governments to expropriate natural resources or to renege
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on natural resource contracts (Kobrin, 1980; Nellor, 1987; Engel and Fischer, 2010;
Hajzler, 2010; Jensen and Johnston, 2011). In April 2012, for example, the Argentine government took control of the country’s largest energy company YPF from
Spain, despite the U.S. government and the European Parliament condemned the
nationalization. Recent cases in Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia also demonstrate
the ease of expropriations in the mining or petroleum sector.
From the discussion above, we know that the resource sector is highly attractive to foreign investors, even though their investment in this sector may be expropriated more easily. Now I turn to the actor who carry out expropriations—the
leader. An essential reason why leaders expropriate FDI is because they feel politically insecure and expect a shorter time horizon (Jodice, 1980; Olson, 1993; Li,
2009). By expropriating foreign owned assets, leaders obtain immediate rewards
and gain political autonomy in making economic policies. This may strengthen
their political power at least in the short term. For example, they can place their
supporters in the positions in the resource sector controlled by the government
or use the money they acquire to repress the opposition. So, theoretically, expropriations should help a leader’s survival. And since assets in the resource
sector are one of the easiest to expropriate from, leaders will most likely execute
expropriations in the resource sector if they feel the risk of being deposed.
According to these existing theories, countries richly endowed with natural
resources might lack an incentive to provide credible commitment to foreign investors or to join IOs to signal their good reputation to foreign actors; the leaders
16

of these countries may also tend to expropriate FDI in the resource sector in order
to secure their power. Recently, a number of empirical studies confirm the expectation that resource rich countries care less about external reputation. Asiedu and
Lien (2010) find that democracy contributes to FDI inflows only when this country is not resource dependent. Jensen and Johnston (2011) show that resource
endowments are positively associated with political risks. Hajzler (2012) provides
data revealing that expropriation acts occurred more frequently in mining/oil
sectors. Voeten and Ross (2011) find that oil exporting countries are less likely to
join international political institutions to attract foreign actors. All these studies
indicate the uniqueness of resource-based industries and the ease with which resource rich countries can attract foreign investors, and imply that resource rich
countries have a lower temptation to cooperate with foreign investors.
In reality, however, we still see resource rich countries globalized to a certain
degree and cooperate intimately with foreign investors and their home governments.9 Expropriations in the resource sector do occur, but they are actually rare
events and can be reversed. The YPF Argentine case is currently filed at the
World Bank’s International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID),
through which Spain seeks compensation for damages. The ICSID data also show
9 For

instance, as one of the world’s major petroleum companies (supermajors), BP operates in
all of the top 10 oil producing countries except for Iran, where the oil is 100% state owned. See
http://www.bp.com/worldwide.
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that, compared to other industries, the number of disputes taking place in energy
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Figure 2.1.: The Globalization of Resource Rich Countries

In the left panel of Figure 2.1, I display the annual average values of the KOF
political globalization index for oil exporting countries and other countries, from
1970 to 2008.11 It shows that oil exporting countries (denoted by the dashed line)
are generally less globalized than non-oil exporters (denoted by the solid line),
but not always. The right panel presents the dynamic pattern of expropriations
of FDI in the mining/oil sector from 1973 to 2000. The solid line denotes the
10 Among

the 178 ICSID cases from 1972 to 2007, 38 took place in the energy or mining industry,
66 took place in the construction or manufacturing industry, and 44 took place in the service
industry.
11 The KOF Index measures political globalization by “the number of embassies and high commissions in a country and, the number of international organizations to which the country is a
member and the number of UN peace missions a country participated in” plus “the number of
treaties signed between two or more states since 1945.” (Dreher, 2006a; Dreher et al., 2008) This
index ranges from 0 to 100 with a higher score denoting a higher level of political globalization. I define a country as an oil exporter when its oil exports account for more than 33% of the
merchandise exports in a given year, a standard used by Fearon and Laitin (2003).
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proportion of the U.S. outward investments insured by the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) in the mining/oil sector out of all sectors.12 As can
be seen, on average, there is around 10 U.S. investments in the mining or oil sector insured by the OPIC. The dashed line denotes the number of expropriation
acts in the mining/oil sector. It shows that expropriations of extractive companies
were much more frequent in the mid-1970s, but since 1976, there has been no U.S.
investment in the extractive sector insured by the OPIC being expropriated, even
though the number of investments significantly increased after 1980.
In sum, the evidence presented in Figure 2.1 indicates a lower level of globalization of resource rich countries, consistent with the existing theories. It also
shows that, as Kobrin (1984) argues, resource extractive companies were far more
likely to be expropriated before 1980.13 On the other hand, it tells the story that
expropriations of natural resources have been very rare since 1980, and that resource rich countries still remain integrated into the international society to a
degree. Therefore, the puzzle this dissertation intends to solve is: why do resource rich countries engage in globalization and invite foreign investors even
though they lack the need?
12 OPIC

is a U.S. government agency which provides political risk insurance to the U.S. multinationals investing abroad. From 1973 to 2000, there is a total of 2,062 investments in 93 risky
emerging market countries insured by the OPIC, and 261 out of them are in the mining or oil
sector. In order to examine the pattern of expropriations, I also draw upon the OPIC data on the
claims of contract disputes. From 1963 to 2005, there is a total of 67 expropriation claims, and
10 out of them are investments in the mining/oil sector. All these 10 cases, however, happened
before 1977.
13 Kobrin (1984) argues that the ownership of these resource extractive industries is of essential
importance to developing countries so the expropriations of these industries were nearly complete
by the mid-1970s (see also Minor, 1994).
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2.4

Resource Nationalism

The previous section mentions that leaders may expropriate foreign assets
when they feel politically insecure. In addition to leaders’ survival concern, the
expropriation of natural resources may be influenced by the public attitude. In
resource rich countries, citizens tend to think that natural resources should be
owned by the state or the people, because these assets are their natural endowments and they should have the right to manage these resources and to enjoy the
whole revenues. Leaders that nationalize resource sectors or companies, therefore, may have a higher public support. For instance, after his inauguration in
1999, Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez started to take control of the oil industry and oil production management. His oil policy, along with an increase in the
global oil price, led Venezuela to receiving high oil profits, and was highly supported by the Venezuelan people. In a face-to-face survey conducted in November
2006 in Venezuela, 66% of the respondents agreed that Chávez’s oil policy brings
benefits to the great majority of Venezuelans. There are also 62% of the respondents who answered that they would support the action of nationalizing private
companies when it is in the national interest.14 This tendency for a state to take
over control of natural resources or resource sectors is called “resource nationalism.”15
14 This

survey was conducted by Ipsos-Public Affairs in Venezuela during November 1018, 2006.
The survey results can be found at http://www.ipsos-na.com/news-polls/
pressrelease.aspx?id=3280.
15 Stevens (2008, p.5) nicely summarizes different definitions of resource nationalism, and his definition of resource nationalism is that it should “have two components—limiting the operations
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An interesting puzzle is that, although public opinion is generally in support
of resource nationalism, nationalizations are actually rare events. Most of the
time, the government or the leader tends to privatize the resource sector, especially to foreign companies. A plan to privatize resource sectors, however, may
result in the tension between the citizens and the government. A clear example is the 2003 Bolivian gas conflict. In 2002, a consortium Pacific LNG, which
consists of Repsol YPF, British Gas, and Pan-American Energy, was formed to explore the natural gas reserves in Bolivia. Pacific LNG planned to transmit natural
gas through a Chilean port, a plan that was supported by the President Gonzalo
Sánchez de Lozada but seriously opposed by the Bolivian society. A series of
protests took place in 2002 and 2003, when Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada finally
resigned in October due to public and military pressure (Perreault, 2006). Other
examples include the Iraq Oil Law passed in 2007 that granted IOCs long-term
contracts and the Nigerian government’s privatization of the energy sector in
2011, both of which caused protests.
So, when the public opinion is taken into account, the puzzle seems to be
more striking: Why do leaders of resource rich countries choose a privatization to
foreign investors, even though nationalization is politically more popular? This
does not mean that leaders never nationalize or expropriate foreign assets in the
resource sector. In fact, resource nationalizations peaked in the 1970s.16 In reof private international oil companies (IOCs) and asserting a greater national control over natural
resource development.”
16 For instance, Iraq expropriated the major oil company in 1972; Venezuela nationalized the whole
oil industry in 1976; Iran cancelled its oil agreements with international companies and took
control of the oil industry in 1979.
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sponse to a paper that challenges the conventional resource curse theory by Haber
and Menaldo (2011),17 Andersen and Ross (2013) argue that the political resource
curse happened basically after the 1970s, when a wave of nationalization took
place. Because the governments of these oil producing countries gained absolute
control over the oil rents, they were able to insulate themselves from waves of
democratization by spending the oil money in buying off patronage or strengthening armed forces.18
While most of the nationalizations were completed in the 1970s, it does not
mean that oil producing countries have taken full control of their oil production
since then. In fact, many oil producing countries switched to foreign extraction
or privatized the oil sector to foreign companies in the 1980s or 1990s.19 The data
provided by Guriev, Kolotilin and Sonin (2011) also indicate that there were only
two nationalizations of oil companies in the 1980s and none at all from 1990 to
2005.20
Figure 2.2 shows the numbers of oil producing countries that adopted three
types of development strategies—foreign ownership, state ownership with foreign participation, and domestic ownership, from 1960 to 2005.21 The data are
17 Haber

and Menaldo (2011) use very long-term data to re-examine the resource curse hypothesis,
and find that oil not only has no harmful effect on democracy, but also may help a country become
more democratic.
18 In his recent book, Ross (2012) argues that the oil curse is a phenomena after the 1970s because
of the joint occurrences of several events, including the tightening supplies of oil and natural gas,
the end of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates that secured stable oil prices, the
collusion of OPEC member countries, and, most importantly, the nationalization of oil.
19 For instance, Peru privatized its oil and gas in 1996; Argentina started the privatization process
in 1989, although the largest energy company YPF was nationalized again in 2012; Romania
offered onshore and offshore oil concessions to IOCs in 1992.
20 The two cases are Zambia in 1980 and Peru in 1985.
21 For a longer time-series, see Figure 1.1 in Jones Luong and Weinthal (2010, p.8).
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Figure 2.2.: The Dynamics of Oil Ownership Structure
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taken from Jones Luong and Weinthal (2010).22 It can be seen that, in the 1960s,
most of the oil producing countries adopted foreign ownership, probably because
they needed foreign capital in the initial stage of oil extraction. In the 1970s,
due to the wave of nationalizations previously mentioned, domestic ownership
became the dominant strategy, consistent with the arguments in Ross (2012) and
Andersen and Ross (2013). After the mid 1980s, however, the number of oil producing countries that owned their oil sectors domestically declined, and more and
more oil producing countries allowed foreign ownership or foreign participation.
So, again, the puzzle still remains, not only across but also within resource rich
countries. If resource rich countries already nationalized, why do they turn to
privatization again?

2.5

Foreign Aid and Resource Wealth

As I mentioned previously, the role of foreign actors is often missing in the resource curse literature, and by foreign actors, I refer to foreign investors and their
home governments as well as IOs. While the resource curse literature pays little
22 Jones

Luong and Weinthal (2010) disaggregate oil rich countries into four development strategies based on the ownership structure and control: state ownership with control, state ownership
without control (with foreign investors’ participation), private domestic ownership, and private
foreign ownership. Private foreign ownership is defined as the case when “private foreign companies can own the rights to develop the majority of petroleum deposits and hold the majority
of shares (> 50%) in the petroleum sector, usually via concessionary contracts” (Jones Luong and
Weinthal, 2010, p.7). Here, I call both state ownership and private domestic ownership “domestic
ownership” and merge them. While it may not be totally reasonable to group state ownership and
domestic private ownership, domestic private ownership is actually very rare because domestic
capital is less abundant in these oil producing countries. In their original data, only Brazil from
1891 to 1937, Guatemala from 1949 to 1982, Romania from1924 to 1944, Venezuela from 1904 to
1906, and Russia from 1993 to 2004 adopted private domestic ownership.
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attention to foreign investment, there is another literature investigating foreign
involvement through the resource curse lens, and their focus is on foreign aid. In
this section I review this literature and link it to the resource curse theory.
Globalization spreads in many ways, and a country can be exposed to various
forms of foreign influence. FDI is one of them, and foreign aid is another. In the
literature, scholars tend to think that foreign aid and resource wealth have a similar effect on domestic politics, both of which are referred to as “unearned income”
(Harford and Klein, 2005; Morrison, 2007; Smith, 2008; Morrison, 2009; Bueno de
Mesquita and Smith, 2010). Unlike most of the countries where governments rely
on taxation as the main source of government revenues, leaders who have access
to these nontax revenues or “free resources” are less accountable to citizens and
are more capable of building coercive power, therefore having a longer tenure.
This unearned income literature basically assumes that foreign aid and resource
rents are substitutes, rather than complements, to each other, because both of
them represent labor-free resources to the leader. If a government has access to
one of them, its need to quest or develop the other may be lower.
While both foreign aid and resource revenues may help the leaders in a similar
way, a big difference is that the provision of aid must be conditional on certain
levels of interaction between donor countries and recipient countries, whereas
resources are naturally owned by the countries where resources are present. In
other words, governments may face some constraints while using foreign aid,
especially in bad times, but may not while using resource revenues. Wright (2011),
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for example, argues and shows that foreign aid fosters democratization during
economic crises, because conditions are generally imposed, whereas oil money
makes democratization less likely during economic crises.
Although it appears that most of the aid is provided to meet humanitarian
needs, scholars believe that in fact aid is used as an instrument by the donor
countries to achieve some political objectives (Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Bueno de
Mesquita and Smith, 2007, 2009a). Building on the selectorate theory (Bueno de
Mesquita et al., 2005), Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2009a) present a theory
to model the “aid-for-policy” deal between donor countries and recipient countries. They show that donors are mostly countries with large winning coalitions
where citizens would like to see “good policy” implemented abroad, such as democratization and improvements in human rights. To provide this type of public
goods, leaders of large-winning coalition countries use aid to “buy” policy concessions from countries with small winning coalitions where leaders supply private goods to fulfill these goals. So this explains why aid not only flows to more
corrupt countries (Alesina and Weder, 2002) and has little effect on economic
growth (Easterly, 2002), but also seems to harm democracy (Djankov, Montalvo
and Reynal-Querol, 2008) and prolong the leader’s survival (Kono and Montinola,
2009; Licht, 2010).
Due to the ineffectiveness of aid, some people suggest that donors should impose conditionalities on aid recipients, or examine the fungibility of aid (Feyzioglu,
Swaroop and Zhu, 1998; Devarajan and Swaroop, 2000; Pettersson, 2007). The idea
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is that, if aid is tied to some specific sectors or programs, or if subsequent aid is
given only when some goals are reached, the usage of aid will be more effective
because it cannot be transferred to other unproductive activities or squandered
by the leader. Aid conditionalities or nonfungibility, however, seems to have little effect, at least in the post-conflict peacekeeping cases (Killick, 1997; Boyce,
2002). Girod (2012) offers a compelling theory saying that the effectiveness of
post-conflict aid is conditional on the donor countries’ strategic concerns and the
recipient countries’ access to alternative resources. If the recipient has strategic
importance to the donor, the donor will have less incentives to force the recipient to comply. If the recipient has abundant resource rents, the desperation for
foreign income will also be lower. Therefore, only when the recipient is not strategically important and lacks resource income, would post-conflict aid help rebuild
the peace. This theory, along with the literature on unearned income, is consistent
with the argument on resource wealth and reduced globalization. When resource
income is available to the leader, he/she has less need or incentives to seek foreign
money, including foreign capital and aid.
Indeed, leaders may have larger discretion to spend resource money than to
spend aid, because the latter is usually attached with conditionalities imposed by
foreign donors. What is overlooked in the literature, however, is that the necessary
level of interaction with the global society may not be lower for resource rich
countries than for aid recipient countries. While a country naturally has the right
to exploit its natural resources, it may need foreign capital and techniques to
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facilitate the resource extraction. While this country may be able to extract and
manage the resources by itself after it cumulates sufficient capital, it still needs to
sell the resources abroad to make earnings. In fact, Voeten and Ross (2011) show
that, although oil producing countries remain politically less integrated into the
global society, they have a high level of economic and social integration. So,
unlike the foreign aid literature that well studies the effect of aid on domestic
politics, such as democratization and leadership survival, an interesting question
that is understudied in the resource curse literature is: how do the interaction
with foreign actors and the level of international integration affect the domestic
politics of resource rich countries?
Also, while resource rich countries may be less eager to pursue foreign aid
due to another free resource they already possess, aid donors may still have an
incentive to give aid to them out of strategic concern. As the above literature
suggests, powerful countries often use aid as a foreign policy tool to help their
strategic partners. It also suggests that aid is usually ineffective or aid conditions
are hardly fulfilled for countries that have alternative resources. These two points
jointly lead to the following question: If resource rich countries are considered
to be strategically important, do foreign governments provide aid, or a certain
type of aid, to them? This question, along with the question raised in previous
sections, will be discussed and answered in the next two chapters.
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2.6

Conclusion

To summarize, the resource curse literature basically takes state ownership
for granted, or at most assumes that the government extracts revenues by taxing
foreign companies and therefore face the same consequence as governments that
take full control of the natural resources do. But in reality, state ownership is not
the dominant strategy; many countries even privatized the resource sector that
they nationalized before. This is especially puzzling when we take into account
the ease of expropriating natural resources, the incentives for leaders to expropriate when their power is insecure, and the nationalist sentiment that is against
foreign extraction, as suggested by the literature I review in this chapter. In the
next chapter, I will answer the question as to why leaders choose to cooperate
with foreign actors. Specifically, I will investigate the role foreign actors play
in the domestic politics of resource rich countries, discussing not only foreign
investment but also other forms of foreign influence including foreign aid.

29

30

Chapter 3
Foreign Actors and Leadership Survival
in Resource Rich Countries
This chapter answers the question of how foreign actors affect the domestic politics, specifically leadership survival, in resource rich countries. I first discuss the
economic benefits of privatizing resource sectors to foreign companies. I then
present the core theory in this dissertation on how foreign actors help prolong
leaders’ survival in resource rich countries. I also use some illustrative cases to
show the validity of the theory, followed by a game-theoretical model of the interaction among the leader, foreign actors, and the opposition. Finally I discuss a
few plausible tools foreign actors may use to support the leader of a resource rich
country where they have an interest in.
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3.1

Economic Consequence of Globalizing Natural Resources

To answer the question addressed in the previous chapter, I first discuss an
economic explanation. An obvious answer to why privatizing is that foreign involvement can bring economic benefits. Foreign companies generally have more
advanced techniques and equipments, can bring in a huge amount of capital,
and can find credible international buyers, so foreign extraction of resources secures a stable provision of resource revenues and functions as an insulator of
risks (Shafer, 1983). The nationalization of natural resources may bring about
short-term proceeds, but it does not guarantee a long-term payoff since the role
of foreign investors as capital provider and risk buffer no longer exists. By privatizing natural resources to foreign investors who therefore have the right to own
and manage these resources, a governments can simply enjoy revenues by taxing
these foreign firms. If a government prefers to retain the ownership of natural
resources, it can license foreign operations such as via production sharing agreements (PSAs) and also enjoy the profits split with the foreign companies without
bearing the costs of exploration and operations.1 Also, state ownership may foster
corruption and rent-seeking behaviors (Shleifer, 1998; Perotti, 2004), which leads
1 PSAs,

first implemented in Indonesia in 1966, are contracts between governments (or national oil
companies) and foreign extractive companies which permit the contractor to explore and exploit
natural resources, particularly oil. The foreign company can get a portion of the production
which covers its costs (which is called cost oil). The remaining profits (which is called profit oil)
will then be shared between the government and the contractor at an agreed rate, such as 65%
and 35% (Bindemann, 1999).
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to poor economic policies and performance. As a result, resource rich countries
may prefer foreign ownership or at least allow foreign participation in consideration of economic prospects.
Through good economic performance, privatization of natural resources may
bring about an indirect, positive effect on the government or the leader. Existing studies on the economic voting lend support to this point, showing that
economic performances have significant impact on the electoral outcome or on
government or leadership survival (Warwick, 1992; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier,
2000; Gasiorowski, 1995). Economic crises, particularly, may cause major harm
to the leader because citizens who are easily informed of or influenced by these
shocks would blame the incumbent and ask him/her to take the responsibility
(Crespo-Tenorio, Jensen and Rosas, 2013; Chwieroth and Walter, 2013). Since the
presence of foreign investors is able to isolate a resource rich country from harmful fluctuations, the leader may be more secure in the position at least due to a
steady economic performance.
An economic explanation, however, cannot tell the whole story. While privatizing natural resources to foreign companies ensures a stable revenue stream,
nationalization can guarantee the whole returns to the government, resulting in
higher profits. While an expropriation act is likely to be punished by reduced
future investment, this punishment is relatively low because governments usually expropriate in boom times and induce investors by favorable contracts in bad
times (Engel and Fischer, 2010). Even though a resource rich country needs for33

eign capital in the initial stage of resource extraction, after it starts to get steady
revenues, it can expropriate easily, as suggested by the FDI literature. Also, a
nationalization plan is usually more favored by the public, due to the resource
nationalist sentiment. So, what else explains resource rich countries’ cooperative
behavior?

3.2

Political Consequence: Foreign Involvement and
Political Survival

As discussed in the previous section, foreign extraction of natural resources
may bring economic benefits. In addition to the economic effect, foreign actors
may have an influence on the domestic politics of resource rich countries as well.
Jones Luong and Weinthal (2010) and Bayulgen (2010), as reviewed in Chapter
2, are two examples that investigate the effect of foreign ownership or foreign
investment in the petroleum sector on domestic political institutions.
Similar to these two works, this dissertation examines the effect of foreign
involvement on the domestic politics of resource rich countries. The difference is
twofold. First, I assume natural resources are so lucrative that foreign investors
tend to enter resource rich countries in spite of political risks. In other words,
in resource rich countries only FDI affects domestic politics, not the other way
around.2 Second, I focus on the leaders’ motivation not to chase away foreign
2 In

fact, Jones Luong and Weinthal implicitly make this assumption in their works. They argue
that governments’ initial strategy to develop the resource sector is a function of the availability
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investors, rather than the whole domestic political environment. In particular, I
argue that the political leaders of resource rich countries strategically choose to
engage in globalization because foreign actors help secure their political survival.
Why does foreign involvement help the leader? My theory begins with the motivation of foreign governments. Natural resources, especially energy resources,
are of strategic or economic importance to advanced industrialized countries. The
over reliance on imported resources, particularly oil, is a high-profile issue in
many developed countries, especially in the United States.3 A shock in the price
of imported resources may also cause economic recessions (e.g., Hamilton, 1983).
So, an essential point made in this dissertation is that energy resources or highly
profitable resources are of critical importance to powerful countries. This makes
powerful countries have a different attitude towards resource rich countries or
resource industries from that towards other countries or industries. In order to
ensure a sustainable energy supply, industrialized countries have to build a tight
relationship with resource exporting countries or the countries where their MNCs
operate. Oftentimes, this relationship is built upon a tacit agreement that the foreign government supports the incumbent and the leader never expropriates or
of alternative sources of export revenue and the level of political contestation (Jones Luong and
Weinthal, 2001, 2010). In their theory, foreign investors play no role in the initial stage. Moreover,
scholars generally believe that resource rich countries have more bargaining power vis-à-vis foreign investors (Kahler, 2000; Tobin and Rose-Ackerman, 2005, p. 10), which implies that foreign
capital tends to throng to resource rich countries regardless of the domestic environments. A
good and special example is the increasing popularity of extracting offshore oil (Ross, 2012, p. 45);
apparently foreign investors just seek to pump oil and their entry is not affected by what happens
in the mainland.
3 Discussion on the impact of oil dependence on national security can often be seen in the media
and the reports from think tanks and NGOs. See Deutch and Schlesinger (2006), Kraemer (2006),
and Crane et al. (2009) for examples.
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cuts the supply of natural resources. The bilateral relationship between the United
States and Saudi Arabia since 1945 is a good example (Hart, 1998; Bronson, 2006;
Klare, 2002, pp. 75-78).
Indeed, resource importing countries or the home countries of resource extractive MNCs have an incentive to deter resource producing countries from expropriating, but how can they achieve this since resource rich countries are in general
less vulnerable to the loss of reputation? I argue that a bargaining chip powerful
countries can use is the threat of intervention in the domestic politics. In specific,
by promising never to support the domestic opposition, a foreign government is
guaranteed the constant provision of natural resources or the retainment of ownership from the political leader of a resource rich country. Although resource
wealth may increase the incentive to rebel, citizens realize that a revolution will
not be supported by powerful foreign countries and thus hesitate to revolt.
From a political leader’s perspective, there is a tradeoff between direct expropriations and honoring contracts, and their decision may be determined by numerous factors, such as the immediate payoffs of expropriations, the opportunity
costs of expropriations, and how they discount the future. While the leaders of
host countries can get short-term benefits by expropriating FDI, they gain credibility and the promise of foreign support by never expropriating. Tomz and Wright
(2010) show that political leaders are more likely to default or expropriate when
the prize of honoring contracts is narrow, and one important prize is the access
to future borrowing or future foreign investment. Theoretically, this prize is less
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important for resource rich countries,4 particularly after the initial investment is
already made and they start to enjoy the windfalls.
I argue that, however, the punishment of disrespecting natural resource contracts may be strong. In particular, this punishment is imposed on the leader, instead of on the whole country, and it is implemented by foreign governments, or
coalitions of foreign businesses and their home governments, not only by market
actors. Recall that a regular supply of natural resources is of particular importance to industrialized countries. Once this regularity is broken or damaged, a
powerful country may punish the host country or the exporting country in order to resume the supply of resources. International punishments can take many
forms, including military intervention, economic sanctions, withdrawals of foreign aid, or diplomatic protests. Because foreign governments still have a strong
desire for natural resources, I argue that a particular punishment levied on the
leaders of resource rich countries is to support the opposition.
Why does this punishment, or the threat of this punishment, work in resource
rich countries? A primary reason is that, in these countries, political leaders face
a greater threat of being deposed. This threat comes up for several reasons, including the increasing value of capturing the state because of the resource rents
accrued to the government, the weakened state capability due to the reliance on
resources, the grievances among those who are not benefited due to an unequal
distribution of resource wealth, and the feasibility of rebellions financed by re4 This

point can be seen in Jensen and Johnston (2011) as well.
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source wealth (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998; Ross, 2004a,b; Fearon, 2005; Humphreys,
2005; Ross, 2006). Due to these reasons, the leaders of resource rich countries are
by nature more likely to face the threat of political violence.5 If a powerful foreign
country or a prominent IO signals or promises that it will support the opposition,
a revolution or revolt will more likely be launched and carried out, thus threatening the leader.
This logic of external support is consistent with the civil war literature that
looks at the effect of third parties on civil war onsets. Cetinyan (2002) suggests
that the bargaining outcome between an ethnic group and the state will favor the
group when the external help that the group has access to is stronger. Thyne
(2006) argues that civil wars are less likely when third parties send costly signals
such as building trade ties or military alliance ties with the government because
both the government and the opposition can foresee the outcome of conflicts.
Here, foreign involvement in the resource sector should be a costly signal since
it means that foreign actors have a big stake in this host country. Even when the
signals sent from external actors are cheap, such as provision of foreign aid or
public statements, they may have influence on civil wars as well. Thyne (2006)
argues that cheap signals that are supportive of the government will reduce the
5 It

should be noted that I am not claiming resource rich countries are doomed to suffer from more
civil wars or regime instability, as one of the resource curse literatures does, because political
leaders may utilize resource revenues to enhance the coercive capacity or to provide public goods,
which in turn strengthens themselves (Ross, 2001; Jensen and Wantchekon, 2004; Ulfelder, 2007;
Morrison, 2009; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2010). The point I am making here is that, in
resource rich countries, there exist more incentives or possibilities for people to launch a revolution
or for the opposition to revolt against the incumbent, even though these activities may be deterred
or stamped out before they really start.
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probability of civil war onsets while those hostile to the government will increase
it. The results of an experiment conducted by Tingley and Walter (2011) also show
that costless signals have a deterrent effect to challengers. So, by sending signals
that are visible to both sides, foreign actors can actually intervene in the domestic
politics of a resource rich country easily. For example, if a foreign government
issues a statement that condemns the leader (i.e. a cheap hostile signal), the opposition may be encouraged to stage a rebellion. Contrarily, if a foreign government
builds an alliance tie (i.e. a costly supportive signal) with or provides foreign aid
(i.e. a cheap supportive signal) to the government, the opposition will be deterred
from rebelling because of the expectation of foreign intervention.
In short, resource rich countries contrast with other countries in that the leaders suffer from a higher potential of political opposition and that powerful countries often consider them to be important strategic or economic partners. Given
these characteristics, the political leaders of resource rich countries may choose
to respect natural resource contracts and to remain friends with powerful foreign
countries in exchange for their support.6 The domestic citizens also observe this
tacit relationship between the incumbent leader and foreign governments, so they
are less likely to engage in mass movements even though they have an incentive
6 Bueno

de Mesquita and Smith (2009b) argue that leaders in small-winning coalition countries
with more resource rents are more likely to suppress public goods when revolutionary threats
are present because they need to use this money to buy the loyalty of their supporters. This
dissertation’s theory corresponds to their argument well when we consider foreign investors and
their home governments as the leader’ patrons and the resource revenues as the private goods
going to the patrons. As leaders anticipate a higher level of opposition strength, they are more
likely to spend on private goods and keep a patronage tie with foreign investors and their home
governments.
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to rebel. In other words, a government of a resource rich country facing little
domestic opposition does not necessarily mean it is favored by domestic citizens.
It is very likely that, in equilibrium, the leader credibly commits not to expropriate and to provide stable resources, a foreign government implicitly or explicitly
approves the leader, and the citizens hesitate to rebel. Once the leader breaks this
equilibrium, the foreign government may turn to assisting the opposition and
start a new tacit agreement with the new leader.
The argument developed here substantially corresponds to the leader specific
punishment (LSP) theory, which says that a country can punish another uncooperative country until the aberrant leader is replaced by the domestic citizens
(McGillivray and Smith, 2000, 2006). Evidence shows that a removal of the leader
did help resume the bilateral relationship between countries in terms of trade
flows or FDI inflows (McGillivray and Smith, 2004; Jensen et al., 2012). My theory
contends that a punishment specifically directed at the leader is particularly likely
in resource rich countries where FDI is expropriated, because powerful countries
have a stronger motivation to punish and citizens have a higher temptation to
remove the leader.
On the other hand, the theory seems to contradict the finding in Albertus and
Menaldo (2012), which shows that expropriations lead to longer leader tenure in
Latin America. A closer look at their theory, however, indicates the compatibility
of these two theories. While Albertus and Menaldo (2012) argue that expropriations help the dictatorial leader, the mechanism is that expropriating pre-existing
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elites signals the new leader’s loyalty to his/her winning coalition (launching organization). So, in fact, the positive effect of expropriations on leadership survival
is present only when domestically owned assets are expropriated. Their empirical
results also show that expropriations of land and domestic banks reduce the likelihood of leader exits, but expropriations of foreign banks and resource firms do
not.
Finally, one question people may be curious of is whether the theory is applied
to all types of regime or only authoritarian regimes. This issue is critical because
in democracies leaders are in general elected by the mass public, rather than
a small winning coalition, and secured by fixed terms, which may make them
less subject to foreign imposition of leader change. Indeed, the theory presented
above looks more like a story happening in authoritarian countries, where foreign
actors assist or collude with the opposition to overthrow the leader. In fact, most
of the resource rich countries, particularly those in the developing world, are
authoritarian countries. This theory, however, can work for democratic regimes
as well, and the logic is similar. Like authoritarian regimes in which foreign actors
can punish the leader by supporting the rebellions, in democracies, foreign actors
can help the opposition party to vote the incumbent out of the office, as long as the
expected benefits are large enough. As Omgba (2009, p. 432) notes, “regardless
of the type of political regime, the international community is tempted to exert
fewer pressures for change in political leadership when considering oil-producing
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states.” So, while I focus more on authoritarian countries, some of the empirical
analyses will include democratic countries as well.

3.3

Illustrative Cases

In this section, I provide four anecdotal cases to show that the theory described
above can explain real world events, at least partially. Botswana represents a case
in which the presence of a powerful foreign company can bring in huge economic
benefits and stabilize the regime. The Libyan case indicates the importance of the
international community’s attitude on motivating civil revolutions. The Gabonese
case shows that foreign governments have an incentive to intervene a country
where their interest is at stake. Finally, the Nigerian case illustrates the situation
in which foreign actors are absent and leadership turnover is frequent.

3.3.1

Botswana

Unlike the three countries discussed below, Botswana is not rich in oil. It is
abundant in mineral resources, especially diamonds. Botswana is the largest diamond producing country in the world, and diamond production accounts for
75% of the export income, 50% of the government revenues, and 40% of the GDP
in 2011.7 In the literature, Botswana is often considered as a successful case that
escapes the resource curse and has a well-developed economy and competitive
7 See

the USGS 2011 Minerals Yearbook for Botswana http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/
pubs/country/2011/myb3-2011-bc.pdf.

42

democracy.8 The literature suggests several explanations of Botswana’s success,
including its ability to diversify the economy, the limited influence of British colonization, stable diamond revenues that enhance the opportunity costs of rentseeking or changing the status quo, and clever leaders (Acemoglu, Johnson and
Robinson, 2002; Dunning, 2005).
One important point that is addressed in the studies is the dominant role of
MNCs, particularly the diamond cartel De Beers. De Beers and the government of
Botswana have maintained a long-term partnership since 1969, jointly owning the
largest mining company in Botswana—Debswana, which produced 22.8 million
carats in 2011. De Beers basically controls the global diamond market, and is able
to maintain a high diamond price (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2002) and
stabilize the diamond income (Dunning, 2005), which benefits Botswana enormously. In 2011, De Beers even signed a milestone agreement with Botswana to
move its headquarter from London to the capital of Botswana, Gaborone.9 Unlike many other African diamond producing countries which reply on artisanal
mining and are notorious for their “blood diamonds,” Botswana gains not only
economic profits but also political stability from foreign extraction.10 As noted
8 In

addition to Botswana, other countries mentioned in the literature that are able to dodge the
resource curse include Norway, Malaysia, Indonesia, Chile, Peru, etc. Among these countries,
however, only Norway is a stable advanced democracy.
9 See their media release http://www.debeersgroup.com/ImageVaultFiles/id 1366/cf 5/
Botswana De Beers Sales Agreement Press Release - .PDF.
10 The African countries in which diamonds were traded to fund civil conflicts include Angola,
the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, and Sierra Leon. Other African diamond producing
countries, such as Central African Republic, Namibia, and Tanzania, are members of the Kimberly
Process, which was founded in 2003 to prevent conflict diamonds from flowing to the market,
and therefore are not blood diamonds exporters. See http://www.worlddiamondcouncil.org/
download/resources/documents/Fact%20Sheet%20(Diamond%20Mining%20in%20Africa).pdf.
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in Dunning (2008, p.264), the dominant party in Botswana, Botswana Democratic
Party, which was formed by the traditional ruling elites, did face electoral challenge in the 1980s and 1990s, but the government responded by increasing social
welfare provision, which was subsidized by the diamond rents. So despite the
existence of fair elections and opposition parties, Botswana Democratic Party has
been the governing party since the independence in 1966, and its dominance is
partly attributed to its long-term cooperative action on diamond production with
De Beers.

3.3.2

Libya

Libya has abundant hydrocarbons, including oil and natural gas. At the end of
2011, Libya has 47.1 thousand million barrels of proved crude oil reserves, which
accounts for 2.9% of the world’s total and is ranked number one in Africa and
number nine in the world.11 Its proved natural gas reserves at the end of 2011
are estimated to be 58.2 trillion cubic feet, which accounts for 0.7% of the world’s
total and is the third ranked in Africa, after Nigeria, Algeria, and Egypt.12
In 1969, a coup led by Muammar Gaddafi overthrew the monarchy, starting
Gaddafi’s 42-year rule. After the revolution, the Libyan government made a series
of steps to take control of oil, including establishing the National Oil Corporation
11 The

first eight countries are Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, Canada, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, United Arab
Emirates, and Russia.
12 See BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2012 http://bp.com/statisticalreview.
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(NOC) in 1970,13 nationalizing the holdings of British Petroleum in Libya in 1971,
and nationalizing 51% of all other oil companies’ assets in 1973.14 However, due
to their lack of expertise and techniques, the Libyan government was unable to
carry out an outright nationalization (ElWarfally, 1988). IOCs were operating in
Libya under exploration and production-sharing agreements with NOC.15
In 2009, Gaddafi planned to take further control over oil. A decree issued by
the Libyan government required the IOCs operating in Libya to appoint Libyan
citizens as chiefs of local operations.16 In a speech via satellite to students at
Georgetown University, Gaddafi revealed his plan to nationalize oil because of
declining prices. In his words: “Oil maybe should be owned by national companies or the public sector at this point, in order to control the oil prices, the oil
production or maybe to stop it.”17
In 2011, a wave of revolutions occurred in the Arab world, which is the socalled “Arab Spring.” In some of the countries, civil uprisings or protests escalated into civil wars, resulting in the downfall of leaders, whereas in others the
leaders survived. And international reactions seemed to play a critical role. In the
revolution in Libya, domestic protests broke out in mid February, and the United
13 See

http://en.noclibya.com.ly/index.php?option=com content&task=view&id=167&
Itemid=55.
14 See http://countrystudies.us/libya/31.htm.
15 See USGS International Minerals Yearbook:
http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/
country/2010/myb3-2010-ly.pdf.
16 See the USGS 2009 Minerals Yearbook for Libya: http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/
country/2009/myb3-2009-ly.pdf.
17 See Sue Pleming. “Gaddafi says looking at oil firm nationalization.” Reuters January 21,
2009. Available at http://uk.reuters.com/article/2009/01/21/businessproind-us-libyagaddafi-oil-idUKTRE50K61F20090121.
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Nations Security Council shortly passed a resolution to freeze Gaddafi’s foreign
assets and to limit his travel. The international community seemed to be on the
opposition’s side, and this stimulated the protests to escalate into a civil war,
which ended in late October with Gaddafi being killed (Cottle, 2011). While some
journalists believe that oil might have played a role behind the no-fly zone and the
U.S. and NATO attacks on Libya,18 I am not claiming that oil is the direct cause of
U.S. and NATO reactions to the Libyan revolution. The point I am making here,
instead, is that the international society’s attitude towards the civil unrest can be
decisive. If foreign governments or IOs signal their support to the opposition,
or provide assistance to the opposition by directly targeting the leader, like the
Libyan case, the leader is far more likely to collapse.

3.3.3

Gabon

The economy of Gabon is heavily dependent on its mineral resources, particularly oil and manganese. From 2008 to 2011, oil accounted for 50% of the
GDP and 80% of the exports. Although petroleum production provides about
60% of the tax revenues, Gabon did not have a state-owned oil company from
1987 to 2011, when the Gabon Oil Company was established by the Gabonese
government.19 The largest oil company in Gabon is Total S.A. of France, whose
18 For

example, see http://www.infowars.com/in-2009-gaddafi-proposed-nationalizinglibyas-oil/,
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&
n=gadhafi8217s-plans-for-nationalizing-oil-could-have-role-in-militaryintervention-experts-say-2011-03-30, and http://english.pravda.ru/hotspots/crimes/
25-03-2011/117336-reason for war oil-0/.
19 See the USGS 2011 Minerals Yearbook for Gabon http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/
country/2011/myb3-2011-gb.pdf.
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operation is through its subsidiary Total Gabon. The long-term cooperative relationship between Total and Gabon was partly the French colonial heritage.
The former Gabonese president, Omar Bongo, who had been in power for 42
years, received strong support from France. A few years after he became president in 1967, oil boom brought Gabon bonanza, making Bongo a big spender who
not only amassed wealth for his family but also used some of the oil money for
the population such as building infrastructure (Shaxson, 2007). While oil wealth
helped Bongo stay in power with little mass unrest, foreign assistance played
a key role in some critical events. In 1990, a wave of demonstrations and riots burst, forcing Bongo to dissolve the ruling party (Gray, 1998). France sent
military troops to Gabon to intervene, changing the situation that would have
overthrown the Bongo regime. Although France claimed that the goal was only
to protect French citizens (Gray, 1998), scholars believe that this had something
to do with French oil interest in Gabon (Yates, 1996; Basedau and Lacher, 2006;
Omgba, 2009).20 Because of this affinity to France, Bongo was able to maintain a
long-term leadership and survive domestic unrest.
20 Even

Bongo himself once said that “Gabon without France, it’s a car with no driver. France
without Gabon, it’s a car with no gas.” to describe the bond between Gabon and France. See
http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2009/09/bong-s05.html.
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3.3.4

Nigeria

Nigeria is another big African oil producer, who produced 28% of the African
and 2.9% of the world crude oil in 2011.21 The difference is that the Nigerian oil
has been owned by the state since 1971, when the Nigerian National Petroleum
Corporation was established. Unlike the oil money in Gabon that is allowed to
trickle down to the population, oil revenues in Nigeria have largely accrued to
the government and not benefited the people, which result in the frequent civil
conflicts and political instability (Omeje, 2006). From 1971 to 2004, Nigeria had
experienced 10 leader changes, and six of them exited in irregular ways, including
being deposed, assassinated, and died in office.
While it is generally believed that oil per se is the cause of fragility and instability in Nigeria, the fact is ignored that there are some other African oil producers
that have long-term stability like Gabon. I argue instead that state ownership of
oil may be the key. State ownership not only enables the Nigerian government to
amass huge oil money, which in turn incentivizes civil unrest or coups, but also
prevents foreign actors from taking part in the resource sector, who may function
as a stabilizer. Had Nigeria had oil owned by foreign companies initially and
cooperated with them persistently, foreigners may have intervened when civil riots or coups occurred. Of course showing this counterfactual requires a more
in-depth and comprehensive case study, which is beyond the scope of this disser21 See

the USGS 2011 Minerals Yearbook for Nigeria http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/
country/2011/myb3-2011-ni.pdf.
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tation, but from the comparison between Gabon and Nigeria we know that the
presence of foreign actors may affect the outcome of civil riots and therefore the
leader’s fate.

3.4

A Model of Expropriation, Punishment, and Challenge

In this section, I use a simplified game to illustrate the interaction among political leaders (L), foreign governments (F), and domestic opposition (O). The
game tree is shown in Figure 3.1. In this one-shot game, a basic assumption is
that foreign investors always want to enter the resource sector and host governments always welcome foreign investors in the initial stage of mineral extraction
because of economic consideration. So this game begins with L choosing whether
to expropriate foreign assets (E or ¬ E) in the resource sector and the proportion
of expropriation (0 < p < 1). It should be noted that an expropriation of foreign
assets may not be an outright expropriation. Oftentimes it is a partial expropriation, and there are many forms of partial expropriations, such as bribe, extortion,
an increase in sectoral tax (Engel and Fischer, 2010), or a rewriting of contracts.
Bolivia, for example, rewrote the oil and gas contracts, leading to an increase in
the revenues accruing to the government (Jensen and Johnston, 2011).
ω ∈ R is the value of expropriated assets; γ ∈ R is the value of not expropriating, such as tax from foreign investors, and I assume that a leader gains more by
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expropriating (i.e., ω > γ). Moreover, α ∈ R is the value of staying in power, and
r ∈ [ 21 , 1] is the proportion L distributes α to himself/herself.22 If O challenges and
loses, the proportion becomes r p ≥ r, which means the opposition gets punished.
F has a default value ρ ∈ R, and β ∈ R is the value of non-expropriated
assets for F.23 After observing L’s move, F chooses whether or not to support
the opposition (S or ¬S). Here, “support” can be broadly defined, including not
only material support, but also sending some signal, such as not being around
to discourage or suppress the opposition. qs ∈ (0, 1) is the probability that O
successfully challenges L with the support of F; q¬s ∈ (0, qs ] is the probability
that O successfully challenges without F’s support.24 δ ∈ R is the cost imposed
on F if F supports O and O fails.25 If O succeeds, O can determine a proportion
σ ∈ [0, p] of β that is given back to F. In other words, F gets ρ + (1 − p) β when not
supporting O or when supporting O but O chooses not to challenge and qs [ρ +
σβ + (1 − p) β] + (1 − qs )[ρ + (1 − p) β − δ] when supporting O and O challenges.
After observing L’s and F’s choices, O decides whether or not to challenge
(C or ¬C). The cost of challenge is c ∈ R for both L and O. For L, if O does
not challenge, the payoff is rα + pω + (1 − p)γ. If O challenges and gets foreign
22 Here

I assume the opposition can be anyone among the whole population, so the value distributed to the people is equal to the value distributed to the opposition, i.e., (1 − r )α.
23 β may or may not be equal to ω. Some reasons may result in an inequality. For example, foreign
investors may be able to sell natural resources at a higher price in the international market, so in
this case β > ω.
24 I assume the probability of success without foreign support is less than or at most equal to the
probability of success with foreign support, based on the argument in the civil war literature.
25 Because the support can be informal or immaterial, such as an official denouncement, I assume
there is no cost for F to support O. But if F supports O and O fails, F may face costs such as
embarrassment. This cost is assumed to be < β.
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Solving this extensive-form game by backward induction, I find one subgame
perfect equilibrium that is very likely and relevant to this study as follows:26

Proposition: There exists a subgame perfect equilibrium in which L plays p∗ , F
plays ¬S when p = p∗ , and O plays ¬C or C (depending on the payoffs) when
p = p∗ and ¬S, when the following conditions hold:

(1) q¬s ≤
(2) qs ≥

α(r p −r )+c
;
α(r p +r −1)+γ+ p∗ (ω −γ)

α(r p −r )+c
;
α(r p +r −1)+ω + p∗ (ω −γ)−ωσ

(3) p∗ = σ ≤

δ (1− q s )
βqs .

The observed outcome from this subgame perfect equilibrium is that L expropriates only up to p∗ , F never supports O, and O never challenges or carries out
ineffectual challenges (without foreign support) whenever the three conditions
are true. Notice that p∗ should be a very small value, since the denominator is
much lager than the numerator (Condition 3). In words, F can withstand L expropriating only a very small portion of their assets, which can be considered
as bribe or any payment under the table, but p > p∗ will trigger F to support O.
Condition 3 also requires the opposition to give back all the expropriated assets to
foreign actors after they win (i.e., p∗ = σ). Besides, if the probability of successful
challenge without foreign support is below a threshold, the opposition will fear
26 See

the appendix to this chapter for proof.

52

to challenge (Condition 1). The probability of challenge success with foreign support should be high enough to motivate the foreign government to support the
opposition and to deter the leader from expropriating (Condition 2).
For other parameter values, the optimal action for the leader is to carry out
outright expropriation (p = 1). In this situation, foreign actors would encourage
the opposition to challenge, and the challenge would be more effective since qs is
higher than or at least equal to q¬s . In other words, the cases in which we observe
foreign participation tend to be those in which a more effective challenge, hence
leader failure, is less likely.
In short, using this game-theoretical approach, I show that there exists such an
equilibrium that foreign actors can deter a leader from cheating by the threat of
supporting the opposition. This explains the political stability as well as the close
cooperation with foreign investors or foreign governments in many resource rich
countries. In the case without foreign participation, which in this game means
that expropriation has occurred, an effective challenge is more likely to follow,
resulting in a replacement of the leader. This leads to the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: Political leaders of resource rich countries where foreign actors are more
deeply involved in the resource sector are more likely to have longer political tenure.
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3.5

Forms of Support

So far, I have argued that the level of foreign involvement in the resource sector
has a positive effect on leadership survival and provided the theoretical reasoning.
It makes sense that foreign companies along with their home governments have
an incentive to remain friends with the leaders, but we also know that in these
resource rich countries leaders are more prone to civil revolutions. So, a question
that follows is: what exactly do these foreign actors do to keep the leader in office?
In Section 3.2, I show how foreign actors support the leader by not supporting the
opposition, and note that the support can be material or verbal. But the question
remains as to what kind of support foreign actors can provide in practice. In
other words, what are the mechanisms through which foreign involvement in the
resource sector leads to a longer leader tenure? In this section, I discuss a few
tools foreign actors may use to assist the leaders who are friends of theirs and
how they work, including military intervention, the provision of foreign aid, and
IMF lending.

3.5.1

Military Intervention

As discussed in the Gabonese case in Section 3.3.3, when a powerful foreign
country has its interest at stake in another country, the government is more likely
to send military troops to intervene. The literature also suggests that military
intervention is one of the foreign policy tools that powerful countries, especially
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the United States, use to secure their national interests, such as the supply of oil
and other natural resources (Gibbs, 1991; Fordham, 2008). Gibbs (1991), particularly, shows that private business interests can affect foreign policy and facilitate
foreign intervention.
In a recent study, Choi (2013) finds that the United States intervene primarily
because of humanitarian concerns, not because of security concerns such as oil
supply. He uses two variables—dummies for oil exporters and primary commodity exports—to proxy for national interests, and finds no statistically significant
results. The null result, however, cannot be interpreted as an insignificant role
of natural resources. As I argue, a resource rich country is important to foreign
governments only when both sides have a cooperative relationship in terms of
investment or trade. Therefore, we may not find a positive relationship between
oil production and military intervention, but we may see this relationship when
we consider the level of foreign involvement in this resource rich country. For
instance, the U.S. government may not be interested in intervening in an oil rich
country that is not exporting oil to the United States, such as the Republic of
Congo, but may intervene in a country where the U.S. oil companies make huge
investment, like Kuwait. Thus, the first mechanism that will be empirically tested
is the following:

Hypothesis 2: Resource rich countries where foreign actors are more deeply involved
in the resource sector are more likely to experience military intervention.
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3.5.2

Foreign Aid

A second possible form of support is the provision of foreign aid. As discussed in Section 2.5, the aid literature shows that foreign aid is often used strategically by donor countries to help their political partners (Alesina and Dollar,
2000; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2007, 2009a), so a theoretical expectation is
that a country will receive a higher level of aid from foreign governments if it has
a close partnership with them in the resource sector. Countries richly endowed
with natural resources, however, have a weaker motivation to seek foreign aid
since they have another source of revenues, as the unearned income literature
suggests. Moreover, much of the aid literature assumes that aid flows to the government and can only empower the leader. In reality, however, the provision of
aid is often attached with some conditionalities or tied to certain fields, which
prevents the leader from spending aid arbitrarily. For instance, humanitarian aid
may be spent on food or medical assistance that can directly help the people.
The World Bank development aid often imposes economic policy conditionalities,
such as the privatization of some public sectors. Therefore, even if foreign governments are willing to supply aid, the governments of resource rich countries
may be less desperate for aid, especially aid with conditionalities.
Unlike most of the IR literature which assumes that states are unitary actors,
one important feature of the theory in this dissertation is the separation of the
leader and the opposition (or citizens). This feature provides a framework in
which we can analyze the political effect of natural resources by considering the
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role of foreign actors. This feature can also be taken into account when we think
about the process during which aid is given and distributed. While resource rich
countries in general have a lower incentive to quest for aid, their foreign partners
may want to supply aid that can help the leader and depress the opposition. A
specific type of aid that can be directly spent by the leader with a high degree
of discretion is budgetary aid. Budgetary aid is provided to finance the recipient
country’s budget and goes directly to the state coffer.27 Oftentimes, the recipient
government has freedom to decide how to allocate this money. So theoretically
this type of aid, compared to other sectoral aid that may be tied to certain issues,
will more likely empower the leader. Foreign actors that would like to help the
leader, therefore, are more likely to supply budgetary aid.
In fact, because of data availability, the aid literature in recent years has paid
increasing attention to disaggregated aid, and examines the effectiveness of aid
that is tied to different fields (e.g., Bapat, 2011; Young and Findley, 2011). Instead
of using aggregated aid data, this dissertation adds to this literature by looking
at a specific type of aid—budgetary aid, and investigating whether its provision
is related to foreign interests, particularly oil interest. A testable hypothesis is
therefore the following:

27 Koeberle

and Stavreski (2005) define budgetary aid, or budget support, as “financial assistance
that supports a medium-term program and is provided directly to a recipient country’s budget on
a regular base, using the country’s own financial management systems and budget procedures.”
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Hypothesis 3: Resource rich countries where foreign actors are more deeply involved
in the resource sector are more likely to receive budgetary aid.

3.5.3

IMF Assistance

Another foreign policy tool that powerful countries can use to pressure or assist another country is to mobilize IOs that they have big influence on. The IMF,
particularly, provides loans to countries under crises and is the most influential
IFI. Ideally, the IMF acts as an international lender of last resort, and its loans
should be offered to countries that have economic needs. Scholars find that, however, because the decision-making rule of the IMF is not based on sovereignty
equality, but on quotas instead, IMF lending and other activities often reflect the
preferences and foreign policy objectives of its major shareholders, particularly
the United States (Stone, 2004, 2008; Dreher and Jensen, 2007; Dreher, Marchesi
and Vreeland, 2008; Copelovitch, 2010). IMF lending and conditions may also be
influenced by private companies since the IMF needs them to provide supplementary financing (Gould, 2003; Broz and Hawes, 2006).
On the other hand, both IMF lending and conditions may significantly affect
the recipient country’s economic prospect and domestic politics. Vreeland (2003),
for instance, argues that the IMF conditions can be utilized as a raison d’état by
the leader to carry out undesirable reform, and rejecting its assistance is costly
for other domestic players. This point, of course, does not mean that the IMF
assistance is always welcome to a country. Egypt, for example, recently stopped
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the negotiation with the IMF for a $4.8 billion loan, partly because the domestic
opposition pressured the government to reject the loan.28 But based on the IMF
literature that shows that allies with powerful countries, especially in terms of UN
voting affinity, are more likely to receive IMF support, we will expect that IMF
loans are more likely to go to countries where powerful countries have a stake
in. Applying this logic to the issue of natural resources, I argue that resource
rich countries where foreign actors are involved are more likely to receive IMF
assistance, which leads to the next hypothesis:

Hypothesis 4: Resource rich countries where foreign actors are more deeply involved
in the resource sector are more likely to receive IMF assistance.

28 See

http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/egyptian-government-temporarily-haltsimf-loan-negotiations,
and
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/04/
2013430174148753997.html.
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3.6

Appendix

Proof of Proposition
This game is solved by backward induction. First, assume that p = p∗ . We
start from O’s choice. To let O prefer ¬C to C when F chooses ¬S, (1 − r )α ≥
q¬s [rα + p∗ ω + (1 − p∗ )γ − c] + (1 − q¬s )[(1 − r p )α − c]. Solve this inequality, we
get q¬s ≤

α(r p −r )+c
.
α(r p +r −1)+γ+ p∗ (ω −γ)

This is the first condition.

Second, to let O prefer C to ¬C when F plays S, qs [rα + ( p∗ − σ )ω + (1 −
p∗ )γ − c] + (1 − qs )[(1 − r p )α − c] ≥ (1 − r )α. Solve this inequality, we get qs ≥
α(r p −r )+c
,
α(r p +r −1)+ω + p∗ (ω −γ)−ωσ

which is the second condition.

Third, to let F prefer ¬S to S, ρ + (1 − p∗ ) β ≥ qs [ρ + σβ + (1 − p∗ ) β] + (1 −
qs )[ρ + (1 − p∗ ) β − δ]. Solve this inequality, we get δ ≥ qs (σβ + δ). Let p∗ = σ,
then p∗ ≤

δ (1− q s )
βqs ,

which is the third condition.

Lastly, to let L prefer ¬S and ¬C to S and C, rα + p∗ ω + (1 − p∗ )γ ≥ qs [(1 −
r )α − c] + (1 − qs )[r ∗p α + p∗ ω + (1 − p∗ )γ − c]. Solve this inequality, we get qs ≥
α(r p −r )−c
,
α(r p +r −1)+ω + p∗ (ω −γ)

which is always less than

α(r p −r )+c
.
α(r p +r −1)+ω + p∗ (ω −γ)−ωσ

So this

condition always holds as long as Condition 2 holds.
To show that these conditions are practically very likely, I set the parameters
at certain reasonable values and calculate the probabilities of q¬s , qs , and p∗ that
make the above conditions satisfied. As shown in Figure 3.2, when the probability
of successful challenge without foreign support is less than 0.5 and the probability
of successful challenge with foreign support is greater than 0.47, the leader will
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ters at reasonable values and calculate the probabilities of q¬s and qs that make the
above conditions satisfied. As shown in Figure 3, when the probability of successful
challenge without foreign support is less than 0.5 and the probability of successful

play p∗ ≤ 0.02, the foreign government will not support the opposition ∗because
challenge with foreign support is greater than 0.47, the leader will play p = 0.02, the
foreign government
not and
support
the opposition
the expropriated
amount
the expropriated
amountwill
is low,
the opposition
willbecause
not challenge.
This is very
is low, and the opposition will not challenge. This is very likely to occur because

likely to occur because foreign support should largely increase the probability of
foreign support should largely increase the probability of a revolution’s success.

a revolution’s success. Different values of these parameters still yield similar
results.

q﹁s
1

0.5

L : p*<= 0.02
F : ﹁S
O :﹁C
Figure 3: The probabilities of qs and q¬s for the subgame perfect equilibrium to exist
in the three-player extensive form game when the parameters are set at certain values
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In short, using this game-theoretical approach, I show that there exists such an
Figure 3.2.:
The Probabilities of qs and q¬s for the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
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Chapter 4
Empirical Analyses
In this chapter, I empirically test the hypotheses discussed in Chapter 3. I first
describe the data and statistical models, and then present the results of the empirical analyses. I also use alternative data only on the U.S. interests and report the
results in Section 4.3. Finally I test the mechanisms that are discussed in Section
3.5.

4.1

Research Design

This section proposes a research design to test the hypothesis. I discuss the
data and variables, and then introduce the statistical model.

4.1.1

Variables and data

The focus of this dissertation is the political survival of leaders in resource
rich countries, so in the main analysis, the outcome variable is whether there was
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a leadership change in a country in a given year. The data are from the Archigos data on political leaders (Goemans, Gleditsch and Chiozza, 2009). Archigos
contains the exact dates of entry and exit of government leaders in 188 countries from 1875 to 2004. Theoretically, the survival of leadership is a continuous
variable since a leadership turnover can occur in any time, but given that all the
data for the covariates are yearly, I treat the outcome variable as discrete-time and
create an indicator of whether there was a leadership turnover in a country-year.
Due to the time coverage of other variables, the period under investigation is from
1975 to 1999, and the sample includes 121 developing countries.1
The left panel of Figure 4.1 presents the frequency of leadership survival.2 As
it shows, a large number of leaders could not survive the first year in office. Many
leaders also failed in the third or fourth year in power. If we divide the countries
by regime type, into democracies and non-democracies, as shown in the right
panel of Figure 4.1, we can see that democratic leaders in general have shorter
survival than non-democratic leaders.
To measure the level of foreign involvement in the resource sector, I use a
variable indicating whether the oil sector is foreign owned. The data are from
Jones Luong and Weinthal (2010), in which they disaggregate oil rich countries
into four development strategies based on the ownership structure and control:
1I

remove countries that no longer exist and that have data completely missing on at least two
variables. A list of countries that are included in the analysis can be seen in Table 4.9 in the
appendix.
2 Figure 4.1 includes all countries in the Archigos dataset, not only countries in my sample, so it
can be seen that it has a larger number of countries and years. Following the literature, I define a
country as a democracy when its Polity score is greater than or equal to six in that year.
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Figure 4.1.: Distributions of Leader Survival, by Regime Type

state ownership with control, state ownership without control (with foreign investors’ participation), private domestic ownership, and private foreign ownership. This dissertation focuses only on the role of foreign investors, so I transform
this information into a dichotomous variable equal to 1 when the development
strategy is private foreign ownership and 0 otherwise. Table 4.7 in the appendix
presents country-years that are under foreign ownership. This variable is lagged
one year behind the outcome variable to avoid the reverse causality or simultaneity.
One may argue that the dichotomized measure of foreign owned oil is insufficient because in reality foreign participation can be in different forms, such as
joint ventures or the PSA system, so I also create an ordinal measure of foreign
involvement, which takes values from 0 to 2 with 0 indicating state or domestic
ownership of oil, 1 indicating state control of oil with foreign investors’ participa65

tion, and 2 indicating foreign ownership of oil. To examine whether it is oil per
se or oil ownership that affects political survival, I also include a dummy variable
indicating oil producers.3
I include a battery of control variables that may affect political survival or
leadership turnover. The first set of control variables are related to a country’s
economic condition. The logged value of GDP per capita is used to test whether
economic development helps a leader’s survival prospect. Economic growth is
the growth rate of annual GDP, which measures the short term economic performance. Trade openness is trade export plus import divided by GDP, which tests
the effect of openness on leadership turnover. Government spending is the total
government expenditures as a percentage of GDP. Leaders may gain support and
secure their power by spending more on social welfares or public service. All
the data are from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI), and
I lag these variables for one year since we do not expect the effect of economic
performance on leadership change to be immediate.
The second set of control variables are political institutions that may largely
determine the term of leadership. Political regime is the level of democracy,
measured by the standard Polity score. Finite term is a dichotomous variable
denoting whether there is a finite term for the chief executive, and the data are
from the Database of Political Institutions (DPI) (Beck et al., 2001; Keefer, 2010).
3 The

original data from Jones Luong and Weinthal (2010) contain only oil producing countries, so
I consider these countries as oil producers. I also use data from Ross (2012), who defines a country
as an oil producer when the oil/gas income per capita is more than or equal to 100 dollars. The
result remains robust when the Ross data are used.
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Elected legislative is an ordinal variable equal to 0 if there is no legislature, 1
if the legislature is not elected, and 2 if the legislature is elected. The data are
taken from Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2005), who originally gathered them from
the Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive.4
Internal threat is the total number of riots, revolutions, general strikes,
anti-government demonstrations, and coups in a country-year. This variable is
very important since a leader’s survival can be in serious danger when such antigovernment activities prevail. Population is the logarithm of total population;
a larger population size may be more able to depose the leader. A leader’s age
is also controlled because it is very likely that a leader leaves the office due to
death, immaturity, or other health issues. Lastly, a time period indicator postcold war is included because during the Cold War superpowers may grow or
support certain country leaders due to geopolitical concerns.5 Table 4.8 in the
appendix provides the summary statistics.
4 In

Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2005), they develop two inclusive variables, the size of winning
coalition (W ) and the size of selectorate (S), to measures political institutions. These two variables
are coded from the Polity indices and the legislature variable. I also use W and S to replace
political regime and elected legislative, and the results are similar. The size of winning
coalition is positively associated with leadership turnover while the size of selectorate is negatively
related to leadership turnover, consistent with Bueno de Mesquita and colleagues’ argument that
a political leader is most likely to survive when the size of winning coalition is small and the size
of selectorate is large (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2005).
5 A variable one may argue should be included is whether this country has a colonial history since
the foreign oil owner may be the former colonizer, like the Gabonese case. The colonial history,
however, can actually be part of the story, and it is a pre-treatment variable. While I do not think
there is good reason to control the colonial history, when this variable is included in the model,
the results remain unchanged.
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4.1.2

Statistical Models

The focus of this dissertation is leadership survival, and therefore a survival
analysis is conducted. A survival model is also called a duration model, a hazard
model, or an event history model, which deals with the duration a subject spent
in a status and can properly model the dynamics of the process until the end
of the status (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 1997; Yamaguchi, 1999). A survival
model has three basic components: the hazard rate (h(t)), the density function
( f (t)), and the survival function (S(t)), and their relationship is as follows:

h(t) =

f (t)
S(t)

(4.1)

In words, the hazard rate is the probability that a subject fails at time t given
that it has survived until time t. There are some variants of survival models,
and they have different assumptions imposed on the baseline hazard (h0 (t)).6 For
instance, in an exponential model, the baseline hazard is flat; in a Weibull model,
the baseline hazard is monotonically decreasing or increasing across time; and in
a Cox proportional hazard model, the hazard rate is proportional to the baseline
hazard (Cox, 1972).
Unlike those models which basically assume that the duration process is continuous, one form of survival models that is commonly used in the social science
literature is the discrete-time survival model. In a discrete-time survival model,
6A

baseline hazard is the hazard rate when all the covariates are zero.
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the outcome variable is a series of binary data indicating whether an event occurred at a discrete time point. This model has the advantages that data can be
structured easily and that time-varying covariates can be incorporated handily.
It is particularly useful and practical for political scientists because most of the
available data are structured as discrete-time. Also, in a seminal paper, Beck,
Katz and Tucker (1998) argue that a grouped survival model can be performed
easily by specifying a logit or probit model with dummy variables or smoothing
spline functions for time to model temporal dependence.7 So, in this dissertation,
I utilize a discrete-time survival model.
The outcome variable is a dichotomous indicator of leadership change, and the
data structure is time-series cross-sectional (TSCS), which is a multilevel structure
with a country-year nested within a country, so the model I perform is a multilevel logit model. The intercepts are allowed to vary across countries to control
for country heterogeneity. To model temporal dependence and make this model
equivalent to a discrete-time survival model, I include the dummies indicating
the number of previous years in office (K = 1, ..., k).8 To deal with missing data,
I multiply impute missing values using AMELIA (Honaker, King and Blackwell,
2011). The results are estimated from 10 datasets I generate, and the standard
errors are adjusted upward (Little and Rubins, 1987).
7 Beck,

Katz and Tucker (1998) point out that the inclusion of temporal dummy variables assumes
the baseline hazard is a jump from year to year, and the spline function allows the baseline hazard
to move slowly.
8 Carter and Signorino (2010) suggest to use cubic polynomials as an alternative, which they argue
are more efficient than the dummy variables and can avoid the separation issue in the spline
function setup. I also try the spline function and cubic polynomials, and both provide similar
results.
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Simply put, in the multilevel logit model, the probability that a country j in
year t when the leader has been in power for k years experiences a leader change
can be expressed as follows:

Pr(y jt = 1) = logit−1 (α j + γk + X jt β)

(4.2)

α j ∼ N (µα , σα2 )

(4.3)

where X jt is the covariates indexed by country-year, γk is the temporal effect, and
α j is the country-specific effect, which is distributed normal with mean µα and
variance σα2 .

4.2

Results

Table 4.1 presents the results. The first column reports the result of a multilevel
logit model that includes a dichotomous measure of oil ownership. As can be
seen, the coefficient of oil producer is positive, but it does not reach statistical
significance, meaning that the effect of oil on political survival is ambiguous.
Instead, what matters is the ownership of oil. The effect of foreign owned oil
on leadership turnover is negative and statistically significant at the 95% level,
suggesting that the leader of a country where the oil sector is owned by foreign
investors is less likely to be removed. This finding supports the first hypothesis.
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Table 4.1: Foreign Ownership of Oil and Leadership Turnover (1975–1999)
Outcome variable:
leadership change
Foreign ownership of oil
Foreign involvement in
the oil sector
Oil producer
Development
Growth
Trade openness
Government spending
Political regime
Elected legislature
Finite term
Internal threat
Population
Leader’s age
Post Cold War

Number of observations
Number of countries

Model 1
Model 2
(All countries)

−0.725
(0.329)

−0.422
(0.176)
0.474
(0.285)
0.000
(0.092)
−0.017
(0.009)
−0.001
(0.003)
−0.004
(0.013)
0.152
(0.015)
−0.619
(0.113)
−0.157
(0.212)
0.082
(0.018)
0.050
(0.076)
−0.047
(0.007)
0.201
(0.143)

0.301
(0.251)
0.003
(0.092)
−0.017
(0.009)
−0.001
(0.003)
−0.006
(0.013)
0.153
(0.015)
−0.616
(0.113)
−0.161
(0.212)
0.082
(0.018)
0.055
(0.077)
−0.047
(0.007)
0.192
(0.142)
2,740
121

Log likelihood
−948
AIC
2,018
BIC
2,379
Notes. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Model 3
Model 4
(Oil producers)

−0.875
(0.437)

−0.012
(0.183)
−0.042
(0.022)
−0.013
(0.007)
−0.047
(0.028)
0.200
(0.031)
−0.825
(0.240)
−0.709
(0.445)
0.063
(0.031)
0.089
(0.165)
−0.054
(0.013)
−0.019
(0.284)

−0.399
(0.230)
−0.001
(0.181)
−0.042
(0.022)
−0.011
(0.007)
−0.045
(0.028)
0.195
(0.030)
−0.829
(0.237)
−0.660
(0.445)
0.062
(0.031)
0.113
(0.162)
−0.054
(0.013)
−0.048
(0.284)

2,740
121

908
40

908
40

−948
2,017
2,378

−274
641
862

−275
642
863

In Model 2, I use the ordinal measure of foreign participation in the oil sector. The result shows that foreign involvement has a negative effect on leadership
turnover. This means that, as the level of foreign involvement increases (from
no participation, participation, to full ownership), the probability of leadership
turnover decreases. In other words, the more deeply foreign countries get involved in the oil sector, a stronger incentive they have to secure their interests,
and thus the more efforts they will make to support the leader. These findings
not only confirm the importance of the ownership structure of oil but also show
that the level of foreign participation matters.
The first two models include all developing countries since the theory focuses
on countries that are resource rich and involve foreign participation, and the interpretation should be that countries with foreign owned oil are more likely to have
long-tenured leaders compared to all other developing countries, including both
oil producing countries and non-oil producing countries.9 However, the theory
should also work when the comparison is made within oil producing countries,
i.e., when we compare resource rich countries with foreign involvement to those
without foreign involvement. To do this, I restrict the sample to only oil producing countries and perform the same analysis.10
The last two columns in Table 4.1 report the results when only oil rich countries
are included. As can be seen in Model 3, the effect of foreign owned oil is negative
9 Of

course, there is also within-country/between-time comparison since the data are time-serial,
but here I just focus on between-country comparison for the sake of simplicity.
10 The final sample includes 40 oil rich countries, which are marked in Table 4.9 in the appendix.
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and statistical significant, suggesting that the leaders of oil rich countries which
privatized their oil to foreigners are less likely to fail than the leaders of other oil
rich countries. In Model 4, an ordinal measure of foreign involvement is used. As
shown, the effect of foreign involvement on leadership turnover is negative and
statistically significant as well. Leaders of oil producing countries where foreign
investors are more involved are less likely to lose their power than leaders of oil
producing countries where oil is domestically owned; leaders of oil producing
countries which allow foreign investors to own the oil are even less likely to fail.
Basically, the finding that foreign involvement has a positive effect on leaders’
survival is robust whether the sample includes or excludes non-oil rich countries.
Based on Model 1, I calculate the predicted probabilities that a leader is removed from power when the oil is foreign owned against when the oil is domestically owned.11 The predicted probabilities are presented in Figure 4.2, which
includes probabilities up to 10 years because only a small portion of leaders survive 10 years. As Figure 4.2 shows, the probability of leaving power is not a
monotonic function of time in power, supporting the use of a discrete-time survival model. A leader is least likely to be removed in the second year in power,
after that the risk increases as time goes by. If a leader survives six years, the
probability that he/she will be replaced decreases as time goes by.
More importantly, if a country has oil owned by foreign investors, the probability that the leader is removed is lower than if the country has oil owned by
11 I

set all the continuous covariates at the mean values, the time period to be the post-Cold War
period, the finite term variable to be 0, and the legislature variable to be 0.
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the state or domestic investors. The difference is not constant across time but is
about 10%. For example, for leaders who have been in power for four years, the
probability of being replaced is 23.1% when oil is foreign owned while that is

Oil is foreign owned
Oil is not foreign owned

0.4
0.3
0.2
0.0

0.1

Probability of leaving power

0.5

0.6

37.9% when oil is domestically owned.

2

4

6

8

10

Years in power

Figure 4.2.: Predicted Probabilities of Leaving Power across Years

In addition to the impact of oil ownership, Table 4.1 shows that economic
growth and political institutions are important determinants of leadership turnover.
Leaders of fast growing countries are less likely to be replaced. The level of
democracy has a positive effect, meaning that leadership turnover is more fre74

quent in democratic regimes than in authoritarian regimes. Whether there is
elected legislature, contrarily, has a negative effect on leadership turnover. This
is probably because the sample includes more authoritarian countries where the
leaders establish the legislature to accommodate political opposition, which in
turn secures their survival (Gandhi and Przeworski, 2007).
Furthermore, the level of internal threat is positively related to leadership
turnover, which makes a lot of sense since leaders are much more likely to be
deposed when domestic political discontent is strong.12 The leader’s age has
a negative effect, meaning that a senior or experienced leader is more likely to
survive.
While the effects of these factors persist when the sample includes only oil
producing countries, oil producers have a somewhat different pattern. The result
in Model 3 shows that oil producers that are more open to trade are less likely
to experience leadership turnover, indicating their dependence on oil export revenues. Oil producers that have a bigger government are also less likely to have
leadership turnover, consistent with the “rentier states” argument.
12 One

may argue that internal threat is a post-treatment variable that would bias the result
because foreign control of oil may cause social unrest, which in turn endangers leaders’ survival.
This argument, however, implies that foreign owned oil has a negative effect on leadership survival, working through a higher level of internal threat. While the results remain unchanged after
the variable internal threat is dropped, the post-treatment bias, if any, will only bias the coefficient towards the other direction. So, if the bias exists, the actual beneficial effect of foreign owned
oil on leaders will only be stronger than what I find here.
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Endogeneity Issue
The results in Table 4.1 show that foreign involvement in the oil sector has a
positive effect on leadership tenure, a finding that is robust across two measures
of foreign involvement and two samples. Skeptics, however, may ask whether
this finding is driven by a reverse causality. That is, it may be that foreign investors enter a resource rich country where the leader is expected to stay in power
longer and thus the political environment is more stable, rather than the other
way around. I believe that this is not the case for two reasons. First, theoretically, resource rich countries are highly attractive to foreign investors even if they
are risky, which is well established in the FDI literature and supported by real
world observations. For instance, a handful of African oil producing countries,
including Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, Chad, and Nigeria, receive large
amounts of FDI even though they are viewed as fragile and risky countries. So,
when it comes to natural resources, political stability of the host country is actually not a main concern for foreign investors. Second, if the result is driven
by endogeneity, then a positive effect of leadership tenure on foreign ownership
of oil should be discovered. However, I do not find any effect when I re-run
the model using oil ownership as the outcome variable and the number of years
a leader staying in power as the explanatory variable, suggesting that a reverse
relationship is not present.
While a reverse causality may not be an issue here, I conduct a two-stage
instrumental variable analysis to address this bias, if any. The result is presented
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in the appendix to this chapter, and it shows that foreign involvement in the oil
sector, instrumented by an interaction between proved oil reserves and economic
development, has a negative effect on leadership turnover, consistent with the
main finding.

4.3

Alternative Analyses

In addition to the oil ownership, in this section I use two alternative datasets,
the U.S. outward investment in the mining sector and the U.S. oil import, to
operationalize the level of foreign involvement in the resource sector. Although
my theory is on how powerful foreign countries support the leaders who are
friends of theirs and the United States is not the single powerful country in the
world, using only data on the United States provides a conservative test and
represents the case of the most powerful country dedicated to the protection of
national interests.

4.3.1

U.S. FDI in the Mining Sector

While I draw upon data on oil ownership, the theory applies to not only oil
but also other natural resources, especially strategically or economically important ones. While I operationalize the level of foreign involvement by ownership
structure, foreign investors may get involved in different forms. Ideally if I have
data on FDI in the mining/oil sector across countries and years, the level of for-
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eign involvement can be better measured. Unfortunately, there is no comprehensive data on FDI across sectors or industries. Alternatively, I employ another
measure of foreign involvement in the resource sector—the U.S. direct investment
abroad in the mining industry. The data are from the U.S. Bureau of Economic
Analysis,13 and I log transform them.14 One problem with this dataset is that it
contains many missing values, which I deal with by assigning zeros or imputing
new data depending on the sources of missingness.15 This variable is lagged one
year.
Although this dataset suffers from a missing value problem, it provides three
advantages. First, based on the theory, powerful foreign governments are more
capable of strengthening the leader. The United States is the most influential
country in the international society, and thus using the U.S. outward investment in
the mining sector can test whether the U.S. government makes an effort to protect
their investors and to support the leader abroad. Second, the data on the U.S.
investment cover a different, shorter time period, from 2000 to 2004. This enables
us to examine the validity of the theory in a different time period.16 Third, the U.S.
13 Available

at http://www.bea.gov/international/index.htm
good thing of the dataset is that it includes negative values, which means divestment. But
a log transformation can only handle positive values, so for negative values, I log the absolute
values and then multiply them by −1. By doing so, I have information on both investment and
divestment.
15 I deal with missing data in three ways. In the raw data, some values are not shown because
the amount of investment is very small. For this type of missingness, I code the values as zeros,
assuming the amount is negligible. Second, some values are not shown to avoid disclosure of
data of individual companies. For this type and other types of missingness, I generate missing
values using multiple imputation. Finally, for countries that are not included in the raw data, I
code their values as zeros, simply assuming there is no U.S. investment in the mining sector in
these countries.
16 However, two variables, internal threat and elected legislature, are missing because of the
lack of data after 2000.
14 A
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Table 4.2: Top 15 Countries Receiving U.S. FDI and Exporting Oil to the U.S.
U.S. FDI
recipients
Canada
Australia
United Kingdom
Russia
Chile
Norway
Brazil
Mexico
Colombia
Netherlands
Peru
Argentina
Egypt
China
Indonesia

FDI in mining
(in million dollars)
30,243
22,167
7,319
6,421
5,813
5,290
4,740
4,672
4,516
3,728
3,679
3,212
2,672
2,245
2,214

U.S. oil
importing partners
Canada
Saudi Arabia
Venezuela
Mexico
Nigeria
Iraq
Angola
Algeria
United Kingdom
Colombia
Russia
Kuwait
Norway
Ecuador
Gabon

Oil export
(in thousand barrels)
13,519,995
9,980,490
9,752,153
9,431,463
5,892,360
2,806,057
2,745,741
2,593,611
2,253,287
1,799,365
1,664,392
1,654,569
1,590,423
1,110,499
919,982

Notes. The data on U.S. outward FDI in mining are the cumulative amounts from 1999 to
2010. The data on U.S. oil import are the cumulative values from 1993 to 2011.

investment flows more to democratic countries than to non-democracies.17 As
discussed in Chapter 3, while most of the resource rich countries are autocracies,
the theory works for democracies as well. Drawing upon this dataset therefore
can test whether the theory can be applied to democratic countries. Columns 1
and 2 in Table 4.2 report the top 15 recipient countries of U.S. mining investment.
We can see that most of the U.S. capital in mining has been flowing to developed
countries.
17 The

sample includes 54 U.S. investment recipient countries. In 2004, 47 out of 54 countries are
democracies (Polity score greater than or equal to six). See Table 4.10 in the appendix for a list of
these 54 countries.
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Table 4.3: U.S. Investment in Mining and Leadership Turnover (2000–2004)
Model 1
(All countries)
U.S. FDI in mining
(logged)
Development
Growth
Trade openness
Government spending
Political regime
Finite term
Presidential system
Population
Leader’s age

−0.030
(0.016)
0.135
(0.181)
−0.055
(0.033)
−0.004
(0.006)
−0.115
(0.047)
0.232
(0.063)
−0.454
(0.893)
−0.075
(0.179)
−0.105
(0.020)

Number of observations
Number of countries

Model 2
(Recipient countries)

−0.047
(0.023)
−0.355
(0.594)
−0.068
(0.091)
−0.015
(0.014)
−0.143
(0.111)
0.221
(0.215)
−0.157
(1.243)
0.058
(0.469)
−0.188
(0.046)

773
155

270
54

Log likelihood
−279
AIC
658
BIC
891
Notes. Standard errors are in parentheses.

−103
274
396
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Table 4.3 reports the results when the U.S. investment in the mining sector is
used as the key explanatory variable. Model 1 includes all countries. As its result
shows, the U.S. investment in the mining sector has a negative and statistically
significant effect on leadership turnover. This means that the more U.S. investment flows to the mining sector in a country, the less likely that the leader will be
removed. Since the sample includes countries that U.S. investors do not enter, the
result can be interpreted as that the leaders of recipient countries of U.S. mining
investment are more likely to survive than the leaders of non-recipient countries.
Model 2 includes only the recipient countries of U.S. mining investment. Because most of these countries are democracies, I remove the variable finite term
and replace it with a dichotomous variable indicating presidential systems. As
can be seen, neither political regime nor the government system has an effect on
leadership turnover. The effects of economic growth and government spending
turn statistically insignificant either, suggesting that in democracies leadership
tenure is basically regulated by institutions rather than determined by governments’ behavior. The effect of U.S. FDI in the mining sector, nevertheless, remains
negative and statistically significant, confirming the role of the United States in
the domestic politics in mineral rich countries where the U.S. investors enter.

4.3.2

Oil Export to the United States

So far, I have described foreign involvement in terms of foreign ownership
of oil and foreign investment in the mining sector. One may question why I
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only focus on the case in which foreign actors already entered and remain in
the territory of a country, not also the case in which the cooperative relationship
is built upon trade or other types of remote relationships. In fact, I consider
both foreign companies and their home governments because, when both have
overlapping interests, their tendency and ability to support the leader of the host
country will be higher and stronger. For instance, multinational oil companies
may lobby their home governments to implement foreign policy that will help the
stability of the countries where they operate. The oil companies can also directly
provide assistance, such as donations, to the leader of the host country, which in
turn help the leader to strengthen the power. Also, when foreign investors are
directly involved and physically present in a country, their home governments
may have a stronger motivation to intervene, since powerful countries like the
United States usually claim that they are concerned about the security of their
citizens and their assets abroad.
This having been said, it is certainly likely that powerful countries will see a
country as an important strategic partner and help the leader if they have oilspecific trade relationships. For instance, building on an oil-for-security relationship, the United States helped Saudi Arabia not only survive internal turmoil,
but also resist external threat from Iran and Yemen (Quandt, 1981; Hart, 1998).
So, even though this dissertation focuses more on foreign investment, as an additional test, I examine the effect of oil export to powerful countries on leadership
survival. Due to data availability, here I only use data on oil export to the United
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States.18 The data are from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA),19
and this variable is lagged one year behind the outcome variable. The third and
fourth columns in Table 4.2 report the top 15 countries that have cumulatively exported the most oil to the United States. We can see that geographical proximity
may play an important role in determining the U.S. oil import. A large portion of
oil is shipped from the United States’ neighboring countries, such as Canada and
Mexico.
Table 4.4 reports the results when the U.S. oil import is used as the main explanatory variable. In Model 1, I include 121 countries in the sample. As can be
seen, the variable oil export to the u.s. has a negative sign, as expected, but
it does not achieve statistical significance, probably because this sample includes
non-oil reporting countries that may have other factors affecting leadership survival. In Model 2, I restrict the sample to 65 countries that are included in the EIA
database, i.e., countries that have a history of exporting oil to the United States.20
The results show that oil export to the United States has a negative and statistically significant effect on leader turnover. The more oil the United States imports
from a country, the more likely that the U.S. government will make an effort to
secure the leader of this country.
18 There

are data on oil export to OECD countries, provided by the International Energy Agency.
Unfortunately, this dataset is not freely accessible to the public. While considering only U.S.
oil import may be conservative, including all OECD countries may be problematic since OECD
members include some newly industrialized countries that may not have sufficiently large foreign
power.
19 Available at http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet move impcus a2 nus ep00 im0 mbbl m.htm
20 See Table 4.10 in the appendix for a list of these 65 countries.
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Table 4.4: Oil Export and Leadership Turnover (1995-2004)
Model 1
(All countries)
Oil export to the U.S.
(in thousand barrels)
Development
Growth
Trade openness
Government spending
Political regime
Finite term
Population
Leader’s age

−2.952
(2.269)
0.171
0.139
0.023
(0.020)
−0.005
(0.004)
−0.025
(0.025)
0.152
(0.029)
−0.167
(0.466)
0.071
(0.116)
−0.062
(0.012)

Number of countries
Number of observations

Model 2
(Exporting countries)

−5.238
(2.055)
0.261
(0.207)
0.004
(0.031)
−0.003
(0.005)
−0.013
(0.035)
0.227
(0.045)
0.724
(0.799)
0.354
(0.125)
−0.102
(0.017)

121
1,142

65
606

Log likelihood
−425
AIC
965
BIC
1,252
Note. Standard errors are in parentheses.

−189
473
685
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4.4

Testing the Mechanisms

While the theory assumes that foreign governments support the leaders of
resource rich countries by not supporting the opposition, the support can be in
different forms. As I discuss in Section 3.5, there are a few theoretically plausible
pathways through which foreign involvement in the resource sector would lead
to longer leader tenure, including military intervention, increasing foreign aid to
the leader, and IMF agreements. In this section, I empirically test these causal
mechanisms, examining whether foreign ownership of oil has an effect on these
forms of foreign support.
First, to test Hypothesis 2 that foreign ownership of oil leads to more military interventions, the outcome variable is the number of military interventions a
country experienced in a given year. The data on military interventions are from
the International Military Intervention Dataset (Pickering and Kisangani, 2009),
which details every military intervention from 1946 to 2005. I transformed the
data into a country-year format which lists the number of military interventions
a country experienced in a year. Since the outcome variable is a nonnegative
count of military interventions, I use a multilevel Poisson model and control for
country heterogeneity. I also include the same set of control variables except for
growth and trade openness because we do not expect these two factors would
affect military intervention.
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Second, Hypotheses 3 concerns the level of foreign aid that a country received.
As I argue, if a country has oil owned by foreign actors, this country will be more
likely to receive budgetary aid that is flowing the leader. To test this hypothesis, I
use data on budgetary aid that are from the AidData (Tierney et al., 2011), which
is a comprehensive dataset of foreign aid and includes information on donors,
recipients, and purposes. I consider aid data whose purposes are labelled as
“general budget support,” and sum up the budget aid a country received in each
year. In this model, I use the logged amount of budget aid a country received
in a given year as the outcome variable. A multilevel linear model with countryvarying intercepts is employed since aid data are continuous. The same set of
control variables are also included.
Lastly, to test Hypothesis 4 regarding IMF programs, I use data on the IMF
assistance that are from Dreher (2006b), which provides information about four
IMF arrangements.21 Following the literature, I code this variable as 1 when a
country is under at least one of these arrangements for at least 5 months in a
particular year and 0 otherwise. The outcome variable is a binary indicator of
whether a country received IMF support in a given year, so the model I use is
a multilevel logit model with varying intercepts across countries to control for
country specific effects. I also include the same set of control variables.
21 These

four arrangements are IMF Standby Arrangement, IMF Extended Fund Facility Arrangement, IMF Structural Adjustment Facility Arrangement, and IMF Poverty Reduction and Growth
Facility Arrangement.
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Table 4.5 presents the results of these three analyses. Below, I will first look
at the effect of oil on these three forms of support, and then turn to the effect
of foreign owned oil, so that we can have a sense of whether it is oil per se or
oil ownership that leads to foreign support. In Model 1, the outcome variable is
the number of military interventions in a country-year. As can be seen, oil per
se does not have any particular effect on military intervention, indicated by the
statistically insignificant coefficient for the variable oil producer. The coefficient
for foreign ownership of oil, instead, is positive and statistically significant at
the 90% level, which supports Hypothesis 2. Other things being equal, a country
in a year when the oil sector is owned by foreign actors will experience two more
military interventions than when the oil sector is domestically owned.22 This
finding is an addition to Choi (2013), who indicates little effect of oil supply
on U.S. humanitarian intervention. In fact, powerful countries do not simply
intervene in oil producing or exporting countries; they should intervene in oil
producing or exporting countries that are strategic partners of theirs. In addition
to the oil interest, foreign countries are more likely to send military troops to
democratic countries, countries experiencing internal unrest, and poor countries.
In Model 2, the outcome variable is the logged amount of budgetary aid. As
its result shows, oil producing countries are less likely to receive budgetary aid,
which is consistent with the argument in the unearned income literature that
resource rich countries have a lower incentive to seek foreign aid. When the oil is
22 Exp(0.782)=2.19.
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Table 4.5: Foreign Owned Oil and Different Types of Foreign Support (1975–1999)

Outcome variable
Foreign ownership of oil
Oil producer
Development
Growth

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Military
interventions

Budgetary
aid

IMF
recipient

0.782
(0.456)
−0.330
(0.359)
−0.282
(0.111)

Trade openness
Political regime
Internal threat
Population
Post-Cold War

0.035
(0.013)
0.045
(0.012)
0.044
(0.094)
−0.177
(0.129)

Number of observations
Number of countries

2,011
98

Log likelihood
−760
AIC
1,538
BIC
1,588
Notes. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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5.435
(1.221)
−4.119
(1.081)
−1.487
(0.364)
−0.100
(0.024)
−0.009
(0.009)
0.240
(0.038)
−0.032
(0.052)
1.216
(0.319)
1.237
(0.395)

1.777
(0.445)
−1.698
(0.388)
−0.386
(0.126)
−0.009
(0.007)
0.005
(0.003)
0.041
(0.012)
0.018
(0.017)
0.408
(0.111)
0.394
(0.129)

2,288
117

2,263
116

−7, 971
15, 966
16, 035

−1, 263
2,547
2,610

foreign owned, however, a country receives a higher level of budgetary aid, shown
by the positive and statistically significant coefficient for foreign ownership of
oil. This supports Hypothesis 3 and suggests that, even though oil producing
countries have their own sources of income, foreign actors that have a stake in
these countries will assist the leaders by supplying aid that can be freely used
by the leader. Other than oil wealth and oil ownership, Model 2 shows that
budgetary aid is more likely to be given to democratic countries, countries in large
size, and countries with a lower level of economic development and economic
growth, and the amount has significantly increased after the end of the Cold War.
In Model 3, I include a binary indicator for IMF assistance recipients as the
outcome variable. As the result shows, oil producer has a negative and statistically significant effect on IMF assistance, meaning that oil producing countries
are less likely to receive IMF loans. This makes sense since oil money can finance
a country with economic difficulties and reduce its need to resort to multilevel
lending institutions. Oil producing countries that privatized their oil to foreign
actors, however, are more likely to receive IMF assistance, as shown by the positive and statistically significant coefficient for foreign ownership of oil. Since
the oil revenues should be more stable in the presence of foreign actors, we cannot
interpret this result as a higher tendency of oil producing countries with foreign
involvement to seek IMF support. Instead, it should be that foreign governments
are more likely to mobilize the IMF to provide assistance to those countries where
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they have an interest in. This foreign assistance, in turn, may help the leader to
further consolidate the power.
In short, in this section, I empirically test the causal mechanisms through
which foreign ownership of oil leads to longer leader tenure. I show that countries
with foreign owned oil are more likely to receive foreign assistance in different
forms, including military intervention, budgetary aid, and IMF loans. An interesting finding is that oil and oil ownership may have competing effects, at least on
foreign economic support such as foreign aid and IMF loans. This suggests that
the external actors who consider a country as strategic assets may supply aid or
IMF lending to help the leader, even though in general resource rich countries are
less likely to quest for foreign aid and IMF support. These findings also provide
evidence that foreign actors not only have the incentive to remain friends with the
leader, but also use some actual foreign policy tools to help the leader.
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4.5

Appendix

Instrumental Variable Analysis
The instrumental variable I use is an interaction between proven oil reserves
(in billion barrels) and GDP per capita (logged). Unlike oil production or oil
export which may be endogenous to political and economic development,23 oil
reserves are naturally present in the ground, so this variable is exogenous and
is often used to measure oil wealth (e.g., Humphreys, 2005; Jensen and Johnston,
2011; Ramsay, 2011) or to be an instrument (Haber and Menaldo, 2011) in the
literature.24 Countries naturally endowed with oil are not necessarily capable of
extracting oil, and those lacking in capital are especially in need of foreign investment. Therefore, I expect that countries with a higher level of oil reserves and a
lower level of economic development are more likely to adopt foreign ownership
as an initial development strategy, and use an interaction term between oil reserves and logged GDP per capita to proxy for the level of foreign involvement in
the oil sector. The data on proved oil reserves are from the BP Statistical Review.25
23 Some

scholars argue that the resource curse literature suffers from an endogeneity problem
because countries that are economically or politically less developed or that are plagued by civil
conflicts are more likely to depend on oil or resource extraction. See Ramsay (2011) and Tsui (2011)
for the endogenous relationship between oil and democracy, Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008a) for
the endogenous relationship between oil and economic growth, and Brunnschweiler and Bulte
(2009) for the endogenous relationship between oil and conflicts.
24 Granted, these are proven oil reserves, whose discovery should be highly related to techniques,
so it is hardly 100% exogenous. The estimation of these proven oil reserves, however, was mostly
conducted by IOCs, or by the colonizer countries before a country’s independence. So we still
have good reason to believe that it is not endogenous to a country’s domestic economic or political
development.
25 Available at http://www.bp.com/statisticalreview.
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Table 4.6 reports the results of the instrumental variable two-stage analysis.
The first column presents the first-stage OLS result, where oil reserves and economic development interact to explain the level of foreign involvement in the oil
sector. As can be seen, the coefficient on oil reserves is positive and statistically
significant, which makes intuitive sense since countries having more oil are more
likely to allow foreign investors to participate in the oil sector. The coefficient on
the interaction term, moreover, is negative and achieves statistical significance at
the 1% level, suggesting that it is a strong predictor. The tendency for oil rich
countries to invite foreign investors decreases as the level of economic development increases, meaning that oil rich and capital poor countries are more likely
to receive foreign capital in the oil sector. The F-test of the excluded instrumental
variable is 10.84, which exceeds the conventional threshold for weak instruments
of 10 (Sovey and Green, 2011; Staiger and Stock, 1997). Model 4 presents the result
of a model specification in which leadership turnover is regressed on the interaction between oil reserves and GDP per capita and its two constitutive terms, and
it indicates no direct effect of the instrumental variable.
The second and third columns of Table 4.6 present the second-stage analyses in which the instrumented explanatory variable enters to predict leadership
turnover. As the result of Model 2 shows, instrumented foreign involvement in
the oil sector has a negative effect on leadership turnover, consistent with the
finding in Table 4.1. Model 3 uses a sample restricted to only oil producers, and
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the result remains robust. These instrumental variable results suggest that the
previous finding is not driven by a reverse relationship.
Table 4.6: Instrumental Variable Two-stage Regression Results
Model 1
Outcome variable
Oil reserves×Development
Oil reserves
Development
Foreign involvement in the
oil sector (instrumented)
Oil producer

All other control variables
Country effects
Number of observations
Number of countries

Model 2

Foreign
involvement

−0.001
(0.000)
0.014
(0.003)
0.001
(0.011)

yes
yes

Model 3

Model 4

Leadership turnover

−0.416
(0.219)
0.473
(0.280)

yes
yes

−0.488
(0.287)

yes
yes

0.001
(0.004)
−0.002
(0.038)
0.019
(0.095)

yes
yes

2,740
121

2,740
121

908
40

2,740
121

Log likelihood
AIC
BIC
Excluded instrument F-test
10.84
Adjusted R-squared
0.899
Notes. Standard errors are in parentheses.

−975
2,001
2,156

−287
625
745

−976
2, 007
2, 173
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Table 4.7: Countries and Years under Foreign Ownership (1950–2005)
Country

Years

Algeria
1963–1970, 2005
Argentina
1989–2005
Bolivia
1953–1958, 1996–2005
Cameroon
1964–2005
Chad
1962–2005
Colombia
1999–2005
Congo Brazzaville
1965–2005
Ecuador
1950–1971
Egypt
1952–1960
Equatorial Guinea
1980–2005
Gabon
1962–2005
Guatemala
1983–2005
India
1953–1960
Indonesia
2001–2005
Iran
before 1951
Iraq
1952–1960, 1964–1971
Kazakhstan
1995–2004
Kuwait
1961–1973
Libya
1955–1970
Malaysia
1966–1973
Nigeria
1962–1968
North Yemen
1974–1989
Peru
1950–1967, 1993–2005
Romania
1992–2005
Russia
1950–1973
Sudan
1975–2005
Syria
1954–1963
Trinidad and Tobago 1962–2005
Venezuela
1950–1974
Yemen
1990–2005
Notes. Data are from Jones Luong and Weinthal (2010).
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2,656
2,647
2,647
2,409
2,445
2,443
2,348
2,635
2,610
2,587
2,607
2,653
2,656

0.145
0.085
0.272
6.784
3.062
67.900
15.823
−1.485
1.640
0.699
1.502
15.803
56.202

Mean
0
0
0
6.747
3.865
58.620
14.175
−5
2
1
0
15.737
56

Median
0.349
0.278
0.606
1.195
7.419
38.458
7.523
6.941
0.766
0.744
3.462
1.562
12.050

0
0
0
4.057
−51.030
1.466
2.976
−10
0
0
0
12.279
18

Std. Dev. Minimum

Leadership turnover
878
0.142
0
0.350
0
Foreign ownership of oil
869
0.258
0
0.438
0
Foreign involvement in the oil sector 869
0.827
1
0.812
0
GDP per capita (logged)
827
7.300
7.310
1.675
4.915
Economic growth
839
3.784
4.361
7.220
−24.700
Trade/GDP
834
61.956
52.318
39.390
9.012
Government spending/GDP
794
14.967
14.175
7.083
2.976
Democracy (Polity score)
877 −2.301
−6
6.864
−10
Elected legislature
850
1.565
2
0.804
0
Finite term
877
0.708
1
0.455
0
Internal threat
850
1.908
0
4.142
0
Population (logged)
875
16.514
16.526
1.820
12.279
Leader’s age
878
57.772
57
11.045
35
Notes. The upper block includes the whole sample; the lower block includes oil producers.

Leadership turnover
Foreign ownership of oil
Foreign involvement in the oil sector
GDP per capita (logged)
Economic growth
Trade/GDP
Government spending/GDP
Democracy (Polity score)
Elected legislature
Finite term
Internal threat
Population (logged)
Leader’s age

N

Table 4.8: Descriptive Statistics (before imputation) for the Sample in Table 4.1

1
1
2
9.962
71.188
275.232
76.220
10
2
1
43
20.940
92

1
1
2
9.962
106.300
280.361
76.220
10
2
1
49
20.940
92

Maximum

Table 4.9: List of Countries Included in the Empirical Analysis in Table 4.1
Albania
Azerbaijan
Benin
Brazil
Cambodia
Chile
Congo Brazzaville
Cuba
Ecuador
Eritrea
Gabon
Guatemala
Haiti
Iran
Kazakhstan
Laos
Liberia
Malawi
Mauritius
Morocco
Nepal
Oman
Paraguay
Russia
Sierra Leone
South Africa
Syria
Togo
Uganda
Venezuela
Zimbabwe

Algeria
Bahrain
Bhutan
Bulgaria
Cameroon
China
Congo Kinshasa
Cyprus
Egypt
Estonia
Gambia
Guinea
Honduras
Ivory Coast
Kenya
Latvia
Lithuania
Malaysia
Mexico
Mozambique
Nicaragua
Pakistan
Peru
Rwanda
Slovak Republic
Sri Lanka
Tajikistan
Trinidad and Tobago
Ukraine
Vietnam

Angola
Bangladesh
Bolivia
Burkina Faso
Central African Republic
Colombia
Costa Rica
Djibouti
El Salvador
Ethiopia
Georgia
Guinea-Bissau
India
Jamaica
Kuwait
Lebanon
Macedonia
Mali
Moldova
Myanmar
Niger
Panama
Philippines
Saudi Arabia
Slovenia
Sudan
Tanzania
Tunisia
Uruguay
Yemen

Notes. Countries with names in italic are oil producers.
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Argentina
Belarus
Botswana
Burundi
Chad
Comoros
Croatia
Dominican Republic
Equatorial Guinea
Fiji
Ghana
Guyana
Indonesia
Jordan
Kyrgyzstan
Lesotho
Madagascar
Mauritania
Mongolia
Namibia
Nigeria
Papua New Guinea
Romania
Senegal
Somalia
Swaziland
Thailand
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
Zambia

Table 4.10: List of Countries in Models 2 in Table 4.3 and Table 4.4
Argentina
Brazil
Colombia
Dominican Republic
France
Honduras
Ireland
Japan
New Zealand
Peru
Russia
Spain
Thailand
United Kingdom

Australia
Canada
Costa Rica
Ecuador
Germany
Hungary
Israel
Malaysia
Nigeria
Philippines
Saudi Arabia
Sweden
Trinidad and Tobago
Venezuela

Austria
Chile
Czech Republic
Egypt
Greece
India
Italy
Mexico
Norway
Poland
Singapore
Switzerland
Turkey

Belgium
China
Denmark
Finland
Guatemala
Indonesia
Jamaica
Netherlands
Panama
Portugal
South Africa
Taiwan
UAE

Albania
Azerbaijan
Bolivia
Chad
Croatia
Estonia
Guatemala
Israel
Kyrgyzstan
Lithuania
Morocco
Panama
Romania
Syria
Tunisia
Uruguay
Yemen

Algeria
Bahrain
Brazil
Chile
Cyprus
Gabon
Guinea
Jamaica
Latvia
Malaysia
Namibia
Peru
Russia
Thailand
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan

Angola
Belarus
Bulgaria
China
Ecuador
Georgia
India
Kazakhstan
Liberia
Mauritania
Oman
Philippines
Senegal
Togo
UAE
Venezuela

Argentina
Benin
Cameroon
Colombia
Egypt
Ghana
Indonesia
Kuwait
Libya
Mexico
Pakistan
Qatar
Swaziland
Trinidad and Tobago
Ukraine
Vietnam

Notes. The upper block includes 54 countries that have received the U.S. investment in the
mining sector. The lower block includes 65 countries exporting oil to the United States.
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Chapter 5
The Role of International
Organizations
Recent decades have witnessed an increasing number of IOs that were formed by
resource rich countries or established to overcome the adverse effect of resource
windfalls. Indeed, these IOs may bring about economic advantages to resource
rich countries, but they also constrain the governments. If this is the case, what
explains resource rich countries’ behavior to join IOs? Does participation in IOs
provide any political benefits to the leader?
Political science scholarship has shown that membership in IOs, especially
in international intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), does generate positive
benefits, such as a higher level of democracy and less frequent intrastate conflicts.
While most of the IO literature focuses on the country as the level of analysis,
this dissertation argues that we should take into account the individual leader’s
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motivation to join IOs. As a self-interested actor, leaders would not choose to
enter into IOs that may hurt their political survival. Instead, they may select to
join IOs that help their political life, such as those privileging their supporters.
Based on this logic, this chapter specifically focuses on the role of IOs, hypothesizing that IO membership has a positive effect on leaders’ political tenure.
This effect, moreover, is more salient for leaders of resource rich countries for two
reasons. First, natural resource production often generates political or economic
problems; so can it influence the global economy. By engaging in IOs, leaders of
resource rich countries not only gain visibility and legitimacy, but also can dodge
the responsibility for any negative outcome caused by natural resources. Second,
leaders of resource rich countries are more able to and more inclined to repress
domestic opposition, and IOs can be a channel through which they signal their
intention to consolidate the power. In other words, the globalization of resource
rich countries may be a blessing for the leader since he/she can maximize the
political tenure, but may be a curse for the citizens not only because the resource
curse cannot be eliminated, but also because political repression may be higher.
Using data on leadership turnover, IGO membership, and resource rents, I
find that IGO membership has a negative effect on leadership turnover across
countries, which means that the joining of IGOs helps political leaders survive.
Moreover, the effect of IGO membership on leadership turnover is stronger for
resource rich countries, as indicated by a negative sign of an interaction between
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IGO membership and resource rents. The results are robust to the use of a dichotomous measure of resource wealth and an alternative statistical estimator.
In what follows, I first review existing literature and present evidence showing that resource rich countries are less, but still globalized. Then I provide my
theory on the effect of IGO membership on political survival, with an emphasis on resource rich countries. Section 5.3 proposes a research design to test the
hypotheses. The empirical results are presented in Section 5.4. The final section
concludes.

5.1

Prior Literature and Evidence

As I review in Chapter 2, the resource curse literature suggests that natural
resources are not always a manna from heaven, but can be a curse for resource
rich countries. While natural resources bring unearned income to the government,
resource wealth or dependence may cause a few adverse effects, including slow
economic growth or a lower level of economic development, authoritarianism
or difficulty of democratizing, frequent civil conflicts or regime instability, and
gender inequality (Ross, 2008, 2012).
In a recent article, Voeten and Ross (2011) point out another consequence of
resource endowments. They find that oil exporting countries are less likely to join
international political institutions, a phenomena they call “unbalanced globalization.” They argue that it is because resource rich countries lack a need to signal
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their good reputation to external actors, particularly foreign investors, and thus
they tend not to join IOs, which are a device states utilize to attract foreign capital.
Support for this argument can be found in the FDI literature, which shows that,
despite a high level of political risks, resource rich countries are highly attractive
to foreign investors because of the extraordinary profitability of investing in the
resource sector (Kinoshita and Campos, 2003; Asiedu, 2006; Jensen and Johnston,
2011). The evidence I present in the left panel of Figure 2.1 also shows that oil
rich countries are politically less globalized.
While resource rich countries have less incentives to participate in the international society, they do not completely avoid joining IOs. In recent decades, there
has been an increasing number of IGOs formed by resource producing or exporting countries, such as the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)
founded in 1961, the Intergovernmental Council of Copper Exporting Countries
(CIPEC) created in 1967, and the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF) established in 2001. The main purpose of this type of IGO is to create an oligopolistic
market to protect from harmful fluctuations and to secure the member states’ revenue growth. So joining such an IGO or forming an international cartel provides
resource rich countries economic benefits by stabilizing the source of revenues.
This is similar to the economic benefits that foreign investors can bring in I discuss in Section 3.1.
In addition to these international cartels which help secure resource revenues,
resource rich countries join IOs that promote transparency and accountability
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such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI).1 Joining this type
of IOs or following this kind of governance-by-transparency codes, resource rich
countries have to disclose their revenues and accept the oversight by stakeholders,
which is believed to be able to reduce corruption and avoid political conflicts in
resource rich countries (Langley, 2001; Gupta, 2008). However, the question arising is: If joining this type of overseeing IOs does not provide economic goods but
only constrains the government, why would resource rich countries be willing to
enter and comply? Does entering into IOs bring any other benefits to the governments of resource rich countries? This chapter seeks to answer this question
by offering an explanation to why resource rich countries join IOs. Specifically, I
focus on the political consequence of joining IOs for the leader, which I discuss in
the next section.

5.2

The Political Consequence of IO Membership

Existing literature on IOs mainly focuses on how membership in IOs affects
political institutions or state behavior. A large literature examines the effect of
IGOs on interstate conflicts, in which the results are inconclusive: While many
find that IGO membership has a pacifying effect in terms of reducing the inci1 The

EITI is an international institution founded in 2002, which seeks to promote the transparency
of resource extraction projects and the usage of resource revenues on public interests. Resource
rich countries meeting its requirements, such as a commitment to work with civil society on
the implementation of the EITI and the establishment of a multi-stakeholder group to oversee
the implementation of the EITI, can obtain the compliant status or the candidate status. See
http://eiti.org/
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dence or the duration of militarized conflicts (Russett, Oneal and Davis, 1998;
Oneal and Russett, 1999; Shannon, Morey and Boehmke, 2010), others contend
that IGOs may instead stimulate conflicts, at least increase low-severity conflicts
in emerging states (Chan, 2005; Fausett and Volgy, 2010). A number of scholars argue that the joining of IOs has some favorable effects, including enhancing
democracy (Pevehouse, 2002a,b; Keohane, Macedo and Moravcsik, 2009), fostering
human rights practices (Greenhill, 2010), and reducing the level of trade protection (Baccini and Kim, 2011).
In addition to IO membership, some scholars examine how institutional variations of IOs affect state behavior. Boehmer, Gartzke and Nordstrom (2004) find
that whether IGO membership curtails or triggers conflicts depends on the characteristics of IGOs. Shannon (2009) shows that IOs are effective in fostering peace
brokering with third party intervention. Haftel (2007) discovers that two features
of regional integration arrangements (RIAs)—a wider scope of economic activity
and regular high-level officials meetings—lead to reduction in violent conflicts.
Hawkins (2008) argues that as the extent to which IOs are accessible to third parties increases, the level of constraints on states increases.
These studies have largely focused on the level of the nation-state or groups
within the state. In recent years, scholars of IR and CP have gained leverage
in explaining important questions by focusing on the incentives and behavior of
individual leaders (Chiozza and Choi, 2003; Chiozza and Goemans, 2003, 2004;
Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2005; Wolford, 2007; Licht, 2010). By considering politi104

cal leaders as a unit of analysis, this literature relaxes the traditional assumption
that the state is a unitary actor. While the literature on the political consequence
of IOs is abundant, little attention has been paid to the leaders. In fact, although
states participate in IOs as a whole entity, the joining of an IO is rarely a decision made through democratic processes (Dahl, 1999). Instead, leaders are the
decision-makers who choose whether or not to enter into an international institution. Therefore, I argue that a focus should be turned to how IOs affect political
leaders.
Since leaders have the leeway to choose whether to join an IO, under the assumption that leaders are self-interested actors and seek longer political survival,
they should participate in IOs that may help their political life. For instance, the
literature indicates that domestic interest groups may mobilize the government to
enter into an international institution that will privilege themselves (Keohane and
Milner, 1996; Moravcsik, 1998) and that global regulation often reflects corporate
interests (Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000). If these interest groups are crucial to the
leader’s survival, the leader will strategically select to enter into this IO, which
will in turn benefit both the interest groups and the leader.
Indeed, theoretically, leaders should select to join IOs that help their political survival, but it does not mean that the joining of IOs necessarily helps all
political leaders. Most leaders’ political survival is essentially determined by domestic institutions or strongly secured by the resources they have, so the level
of globalization may not influence their tenure. Leaders of resource rich coun105

tries, however, face a higher level of domestic threat, as I point out in Chapter
3. In other words, while leaders of resource rich countries may harness resource
revenues to strengthen their power (Ross, 2001; Jensen and Wantchekon, 2004;
Ulfelder, 2007; Morrison, 2009; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2010), they inherently face a higher level of revolutionary threat. So while they lack a need to
participate in IOs to attract foreign capital, they may need to rely on external actors to consolidate their power. I argue that membership in IOs has the effect of
prolonging leadership survival in resource rich countries, and this effect works
through a few mechanisms.
First, existing literature suggests that participation in influential international
institutions provides political leaders legitimacy and conveys information to domestic audience (Hurd, 1999, 2005; Voeten, 2005; Chapman, 2007). This informational function of IOs may be stronger for resource rich countries because issues
related to resource production often have considerable influence on the international society. For example, the Egyptian president Anwar Sadat led OPEC members to initiate the 1973 oil embargo, which makes his popularity skyrocket not
only within Egypt but also among the Arab world. By entering into prominent
IOs, especially resource-based IOs, therefore, political leaders signal to domestic
citizens their ability to make important decisions in the international society, particularly when a decision by this type of IOs can greatly affect the global economy
or international politics. This not only increases the leaders’ reputation internationally but also consolidates their power domestically.
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On the other hand, domestically, resource production oftentimes causes political and economic problems, as the resource curse literature suggests. Some
scholars contend that IOs can be a scapegoat for domestic politicians.2 This function of IOs can be particularly useful for resource rich countries. When member
countries suffer from negative symptoms natural resources bring about, such as
market volatility, the leaders can blame the IO and shirk the responsibility. For
instance, OPEC members have to follow the policy of oil production limits, so,
unlike non-OPEC members, they are unable to compensate for low price by increasing production. If a member state’s economy is hurt during an oil bust,
the leader can attribute the economic shock to the OPEC production ceiling. So
membership in IOs may not only help enhance the leaders’ prestige but also undertake the responsibility of resource curse if there is any, which holds the leaders
less accountable and prolongs their survival.
Furthermore, joining an international agreement means the government is put
under international surveillance, which may actually benefit the government by
signaling its credibility. For non-democracies, this signaling effect is particularly
important because they need domestic audiences and external actors to believe
they are unbiased and reliable (Fang, 2008; Fang and Owen, 2011). In other words,
international institutions not only play the role of “alarm-sounders” (McCubbins
and Schwartz, 1984) to help citizens monitor their governments, but also can be
an umbrella under which political leaders can engage in unpopular activities.
2 This

view can be seen in Vaubel (1986) in general and Vreeland (2003) in specific for the IMF.
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Recent literature finds that while some countries may enter into an international institution in order to achieve its principal goal, others join this IO to pursue a contrary purpose.3 For resource rich countries, by constraining themselves
to an IO, the leaders gain credibility on the commitment to the provision of public goods or to the practice of repression. Knowing the role of IOs, citizens have
higher confidence in governments’ promise. Foreign governments may also believe that the member countries have a determination to improve their domestic
political environments. The consequence is therefore a social order similar to
what North et al. (2009) term as “limited access order,” in which the leader supplies public goods or coerce/coopt the opposition whereas citizens do not resort
to violence.4
The above argument provides a political explanation to why resource rich
countries form or join IOs. The last point, moreover, explains why resource rich
countries enter into IOs that may constrain the governments such as the EITI. An
interesting pattern of the EITI members is that a majority of them are unstable
non-democracies.5 Does this mean that the EITI is ineffective? According to my
3 This

kind of arguments can be seen in several issue areas. For example, Kelley (2008) argues
that, to seek legitimacy, cheating governments instead find it rational to invite international election monitors; Hollyer and Rosendorff (2009) argue that autocrats may decide to sign the UN
Convention Against Torture to actually signal to the domestic opposition their low costs to repress. This explains the puzzle of why cheating/torturing governments are willing to participate
in anti-cheating/anti-torturing international agreements.
4 Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2010) argue that leaders having non-tax revenues such as natural
resources or foreign aid are more likely to eliminate revolutionary threats, particularly by suppressing public goods (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2009b), and therefore have longer political
survival. Following this logic, I argue that this effect can be stronger after a resource rich country
joins resource-based IOs because the leader’s legitimacy is further secured.
5 Currently the EITI has 18 compliant states and 18 candidate states. Out of the 18 compliant states,
11 are non-democracies (Polity score less than six in 2010). Out of the 18 candidate states, there
is a high of 13 that are non-democracies. All of these 24 non-democratic countries experienced a
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argument, it is because these countries self-selected into the EITI as a signal to
both foreign actors and domestic citizens. To foreign actors, the participatory
leaders intend to show their willingness to follow the rules by behaving as if they
are carrying out reforms, thus attracting more investment in the mining sector
or reducing foreign attention to their domestic politics. To domestic citizens, the
leaders display their legitimacy and their intention to consolidate the authority
by participating in an international agreement monitoring them. Following this
logic, we may hardly believe that the EITI can achieve its main goal,6 but rather
predict that the leaders of the compliant and candidate states will stay in power
longer.
In short, IOs have a positive effect on the prospect of leaders’ survival, especially in resource rich countries, which works through a few mechanisms. First,
leaders strategically choose to enter into IOs that help their political life, such as
IOs that benefit their supporters. Second, membership in IOs helps increase political leaders’ international visibility, which heightens their domestic popularity.
Third, IOs can be a scapegoat for leaders when unpopular outcomes are present.
Lastly, political leaders signal their resolve to secure their power by joining IOs.
This effect, moreover, will be stronger for resource rich countries because leaders
of these countries particularly need IOs as a stage to demonstrate their influence
externally and as an umbrella to cover their nasty activities domestically. Thereregime change in the past 20 years. Contrarily, countries having stable regimes, either democracies
or autocracies, rarely enter into this agreement.
6 In fact, some scholars argue that the EITI is not as effective as transparency proponents expect
(Kolstad and Wiig, 2009; Haufler, 2010; Aaronson, 2011).
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fore, two hypotheses can be derived as follows:

Hypothesis 5.1: The more IOs a country participates in, the more likely that the leader
will have longer political survival.

Hypothesis 5.2 : The effect of IO membership on political survival will be stronger
for leaders of resource rich countries.

5.3

Research Design

This section proposes a research design to test the hypotheses. I first discuss
the data and variables, and then introduce the statistical model.

5.3.1

Variables and Data

The focus in this chapter is the political survival of leaders, especially in resource rich countries, so, like the main empirical analysis in Chapter 4, the outcome variable here is whether there was a leadership change in a country in a
given year. The period under investigation is from 1975 to 1999, and the sample
includes 132 countries. A list of countries that are included in the analysis can be
seen in Table 5.3 in the appendix.
The key explanatory variable is the number of IGOs to which a country is a
member in a given year. The data are taken from the International Governmental
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Organization (IGO) Data (Wallace and Singer, 1970; Pevehouse, Nordstrom and
Warnke, 2004), which provides IGO membership information from 1964 to 2000.
An IO is defined as an IGO when it has at least three member states and possesses
indication of institutionalization such as a headquarters or permanent staff (Pevehouse, Nordstrom and Warnke, 2004). Indeed, the theory I have discussed so
far is concerned with IOs, or even more broadly international institutions, rather
than merely formal IGOs. But I use data on IGOs for two reasons. First, quality
data only exist on IGOs, and the literature mostly uses IGO data as well. Second,
IOs include IGOs and international NGOs. I exclude NGOs because these IOs’
members are individuals, businesses, or interest groups, rather than governments.
Since governments may not exert direct or formal influence through NGOs, we
do not expect membership in NGOs to affect government leaders’ tenure.7
To test the hypothesis that leaders of resource rich countries are more likely to
benefit from IGO membership, I utilize a variable resource rents to measure the
level of natural resource endowments. The data are from Hamilton and Clemens
(1999), which calculate the annual rents generated by nonrenewable energy resources between 1970 and 1999. Using data on resource rents is preferred to other
measurements of resource wealth such as production or export because rents directly accrue to the government, which in turn leads to the political and economic
curses scholars claim (Ross, 2006). It is especially relevant to the theory in this
7 Another

issue people may question is the usage of the number of IGOs. This basically assumes
that every IGO has an identical effect, which may hardly be the case. While there are other
ways to code this variable, such as weighting by the salience or prestige of an IGO, a careful and
overarching weighting scheme is currently unavailable and is left for future research. Here, like
most of the literature, I only use the count of IGO memberships.
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chapter because the focus is on how leaders can spend resource rents on activities
that help their survival under the umbrella of IOs.
I include the same battery of control variables that are included in the main
analysis in Chapter 4, including the logged value of GDP per capita, economic
growth, trade openness, government spending, political regime, finite term, elected
legislative, internal threat, population, and leader’s age. Table 5.4 in the appendix
provides the summary statistics.

5.3.2

Statistical Model

The statistical model I use is basically the same as the one in Chapter 4. The
outcome variable is a dichotomous indicator of leadership change, and the data
structure is a multilevel structure with a country-year nested within a country,
so I utilize a multilevel logit model. The intercepts are allowed to vary across
countries to control for country heterogeneity. The only difference is that I also
allow the intercepts to vary across years rather than simply including a dummy
variable for post-Cold War. The inclusion of year effects can help control for
contemporaneous shocks, and this is important here because countries tend to
join IOs in the same year, particularly the year when the IO was established.8
To model temporal dependence, I include the cubic smoothing splines or the
dummies indicating the number of previous years in office.
8 For

instance, most of the OECD members joined OCED in 1961; most of the WTO members
obtained membership in 1995 or 1996; post-Soviet states actively became IO members in 1992 or
1993. So the inclusion of year-varying intercepts can account for specific effects of these years.

112

Simply put, in the multilevel logit model, the probability that a country j in
year t experiences a leader change can be expressed as follows:

Pr(y jt = 1) = logit−1 (α j + γt + X jt β)

(5.1)

α j ∼ N (µα , σα2 )

(5.2)

γt ∼ N (µγ , σγ2 )

(5.3)

where X jt is the covariates indexed by country-year (including temporal splines
or dummies), α j is the country-specific effect, and γt is the year-specific effect.
Both country and year effects are assumed to be random and distributed normal.

5.4

Results

Table 5.1 presents the results. The first column reports the result of a multilevel
logit model that includes a smoothing spline function of time to control for time
dependence. As can be seen, the coefficient of igo membership is negative and
statistically significant at the 99% level, meaning that a leader is less likely to
be removed when the country belongs to more IGOs. Model 2 is equivalent to
Model 1 except that the spline function is substituted with dummy variables for
previous years in office. The result is similar to the result of Model 1, both of
which support Hypothesis 5.1.
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Table 5.1: IGO Memberships, Resource Rents, and Leadership Turnover (1975–
1999)
DV: Leadership change
(Time dependence)
IGO membership
Resource rents (logged)
IGO membership×
Resource rents
Development
Growth
Trade openness
Government spending
Political regime
Legislature elected
Finite term
Internal threat
Population (logged)
Leader’s age

Number of observations
Number of countries

Model 1
Spline

Model 2
Dummy

−0.017
(0.006)
0.002
(0.014)

−0.017
(0.006)
0.001
(0.014)

0.176
(0.100)
−0.019
(0.012)
−0.003
(0.003)
−0.010
(0.014)
0.185
(0.019)
−0.791
(0.146)
−0.178
(0.252)
0.057
(0.016)
0.258
(0.112)
−0.063
(0.007)

0.178
(0.100)
−0.019
(0.012)
−0.003
(0.003)
−0.008
(0.014)
0.183
(0.019)
0.793
(0.148)
−0.177
(0.253)
0.058
(0.017)
0.270
(0.113)
−0.061
(0.007)

2,633
132

Model 3
Spline

Model 4
Dummy

−0.001
(0.009)
0.060
(0.030)
−0.001
(0.0005)
0.181
(0.099)
−0.020
(0.012)
−0.003
(0.003)
−0.008
(0.014)
0.189
(0.019)
0.818
(0.147)
−0.171
(0.252)
0.056
(0.016)
0.284
(0.112)
−0.064
(0.007)

−0.002
(0.009)
0.054
(0.030)
−0.001
(0.0004)
0.182
(0.099)
−0.020
(0.012)
−0.002
(0.003)
−0.006
(0.014)
0.186
(0.019)
0.820
(0.149)
−0.172
(0.253)
0.056
(0.012)
0.296
(0.112)
−0.062
(0.007)

2,633
132

2,633
132

2,633
132

Log likelihood
−1, 017
−1, 000
AIC
2,088
2,122
BIC
2,247
2,481
Notes. Standard errors are in parentheses.

−1, 015
2,085
2,250

−997.9
2,120
2,484
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In Model 3 and Model 4, I include an interaction term between igo membership and resource rents to test if the effect is stronger for resource rich countries.
As Model 3 shows, after the interaction term enters the model, the coefficient of
igo membership turns statistically insignificant and the coefficient of resource
rents turns statistically significant. Moreover, the interaction term is negative
and statistically significant at the 95% level, which suggests that the effect of IGO
membership is not constant across countries. Instead, as the level of resource rents
a country has increases, the effect of IGO membership on leadership turnover decreases. This means that IGOs lead to a lower likelihood of leadership turnover
in resource rich countries than in other countries, lending support to Hypothesis
5.2.
I graphically present the marginal effect of IGO membership on leadership
turnover conditional on resource rents and the 95% confidence intervals in the
left panel of Figure 5.1, since it is widely known that the marginal effect of a conditional variable and its standard errors cannot be interpreted just based on the
regression table (Brambor, Clark and Golder, 2006). As the left pane of Figure 5.1
shows, membership in IGOs has a negative effect on leadership turnover, suggesting that the participation in IGOs helps prolong a leader’s survival. For countries
having a higher level of resource rents, moreover, this effect is more salient. The
histogram in red displays the distribution of resource rents. We can see that a
substantial portion of country-years do not have any resource rents, indicated by
the bar on the leftmost side. For these countries, the effect of IGO membership on
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leadership turnover is basically statistically indistinguishable from zero. But for
other countries, the more resource rents they have, the stronger the effect of IGO
membership is.
On the other hand, the right panel of Figure 5.1 displays the marginal effect of
resource rents on leadership turnover depending on the number of IGO memberships. The density plot in red displays the distribution of IGO membership, which
shows that the mode is about 50. As can be seen, resource rents have little effect
on leadership change when the country is inactive in participating in IGOs. As
the number of IGOs a country belongs to increases, the effect of resource rents on
leadership turnover decreases. In other words, leaders of resource rich countries
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Figure 5.1.: Marginal Effects of IGO Membership and Resource Rents on Leadership Turnover
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In addition to the impact of IGO membership and resource rents, Table 5.1
shows that economic conditions and political institutions are important determinants of leadership turnover, largely consistent with the findings in Chapter 4. In
wealthier countries, leadership change is more frequent, probably because people put higher expectation on leaders. This finding is also present in Bueno de
Mesquita and Smith (2009b). Leaders of fast growing countries are less likely to be
replaced, suggesting that economic performance greatly affects leaders’ survival.
The level of democracy has a positive effect; leadership turnover is more frequent
in democratic regimes than in authoritarian regimes. Whether there is elected
legislature, contrarily, has a negative effect on leadership turnover, suggesting
that representation helps stabilize a leader’s survival. Finally, the level of internal
threat and the population size are positively related to leadership turnover, and
the leader’s age has a negative effect.

Robustness Analysis
To check the robustness of the results, I use an alternative measure of resource
wealth and an alternative survival model. First, much of the resource curse literature focuses only on oil, since oil is the most important natural resource and
it is relatively easy to identify whether a country is oil rich. I use a dichotomous
variable oil producer to replace the resource rents variable. The data on oil producers are from Ross (2012), who defines a country as an oil producer when the
per capita oil and gas production in a year is greater than or equal to 100 dollars.
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There are 44 oil producing countries in the sample, which are marked in Table 5.3
in the appendix.
The results when the oil producer variable is used are presented in Model 1
and Model 2 of Table 5.2.9 As can be seen in Model 1, IGO membership has a
negative effect on leadership change, consistent with the results in Table 5.1. In
Model 2, which includes an interaction term between igo membership and oil
producer, the effect of IGO membership remains negative and statistically significant. Moreover, the interaction term has a negative and statistically significant
coefficient, which means that the negative effect of IGO membership on leadership turnover is stronger for oil producing countries.
Second, I utilize a Cox proportional hazard model, which is also a widely
used survival model, and include shared frailty for countries to account for the
unobserved country heterogeneity (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004). The statistical results estimated by the Cox proportional hazard model are presented in
Model 3 and Model 4 of Table 5.2.10 The results in both models are very similar to those produced by the discrete-time survival model. Membership in IGOs
reduces the hazard of being deposed for a leader, and this effect increases as the
level of resource rents a country enjoys increases.
9I

only present results estimated by a multilevel model with temporal spline functions. The results
when temporal dummy variables are used are unchanged, but not shown here.
10 Because a shared-frailty model does not allow two random effects (frailty), I do not control for
year-specific effects in this model; instead, I use a variable indicating post-Cold War period to
account for any possible systematic shocks after the Cold War ended.
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Table 5.2: IGO Memberships, Oil, and Leadership Turnover (1975–1999)
DV: Leadership change
IGO membership
Resource rents (logged)
Oil producer
IGO membership×
Oil producer (resource rents)
Development
Growth
Trade openness
Government spending
Political regime
Legislature elected
Finite term
Internal threat
Population (logged)
Leader’s age
Post-Cold War

Number of observations
Number of countries

Model 1
Model 2
(Multilevel models)

−0.014
(0.006)

−0.010
(0.006)

−0.293
(0.230)

0.799
(0.612)
−0.017
(0.009)
0.165
(0.091)
−0.017
(0.011)
−0.003
(0.003)
−0.006
(0.013)
0.174
(0.018)
−0.785
(0.137)
−0.106
(0.243)
0.062
(0.016)
0.208
(0.092)
−0.059
(0.007)

0.175
(0.092)
−0.017
(0.011)
−0.003
(0.003)
−0.006
(0.013)
0.172
(0.018)
−0.789
(0.137)
−0.108
(0.243)
0.060
(0.016)
0.211
(0.093)
−0.059
(0.007)

2,784
141

2,784
141

Log likelihood
−1, 074
AIC
2,202
BIC
2,362
Likelihood ratio test
Notes. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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−1, 072
2,200
2,366

Model 3
Model 4
(Cox PH models)

−0.015
(0.005)
−0.016
(0.012)

−0.004
(0.008)
0.030
(0.024)

0.233
(0.073)
−0.012
(0.009)
−0.002
(0.002)
−0.005
(0.011)
0.116
(0.016)
−0.478
(0.118)
−0.169
(0.211)
0.008
(0.012)
0.190
(0.085)
−0.027
(0.006)
0.313
(0.127)

−0.0006
(0.0004)
0.207
(0.075)
−0.014
(0.009)
−0.002
(0.002)
−0.005
(0.011)
0.120
(0.015)
0.477
(0.118)
−0.146
(0.211)
0.009
(0.012)
0.186
(0.088)
−0.028
(0.006)
0.278
(0.127)

2,469
132

2,469
132

354

375

5.5

Conclusion

The presence of natural resources is a double-edged sword to political leaders.
It can be a blessing because it strengthens their power by generating windfalls
and reducing the need to tax citizens (Morrison, 2009). Because of these windfalls, resource rich countries have little incentive to participate in the international
society (Voeten and Ross, 2011). It may also be a curse because resource wealth
motivates or facilities political opposition to carry out anti-government activities
(Ross, 2004b; Dunning, 2008). Due to this revolutionary threat, I argue, leaders
of resource rich countries may resort to external forces to help consolidate their
power. Therefore, although resource rich countries tend to be less globalized,
leaders of these countries strategically choose to enter into IOs to improve their
own political survival prospects.
While this dissertation focuses on resource rich countries, the argument developed in this chapter here can be applied to all countries. IGO membership helps
leaders because leaders select to enter into IOs that benefit their patrons and
because participation in IOs provides visibility and legitimacy to leaders. This
effect, however, will be stronger for resource rich countries since they particularly
need IGOs to cover their intention to strengthen the power and to be a scapegoat
when the resource curse is present. In this chapter, I therefore hypothesize that
IGO membership has a positive effect on leadership survival, in general, and on
leadership survival in resource rich countries, in particular.
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To test the hypotheses, I draw upon data on leadership turnover, IGO membership, and resource rents. The result shows that the more IGOs a country belongs
to, the longer the leader will stay in power. This effect, furthermore, is contingent on the extent to which a country enjoys resource windfalls. As the level of
resource rents increases, the effect of IGO membership on leadership turnover
decreases, meaning that IGO membership makes leaders less likely to be removed
in resource rich countries.
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5.6

Appendix

Table 5.3: List of Countries Included in the Empirical Analysis in Table 5.1
Albania
Armenia
Bangladesh
Bolivia
Burkina Faso
Canada
China
Costa Rica
Denmark
El Salvador
Finland
Georgia
Guatemala
Honduras
Iran
Ivory Coast
Kazakhstan
Laos
Macedonia
Mali
Moldova
Namibia
Nicaragua
Pakistan
Peru
Romania
Sierra Leone
South Africa
Sweden
Tanzania
Tunisia
Ukraine
Uzbekistan

Algeria
Australia
Belarus
Botswana
Burundi
Central African Rep.
Colombia
Croatia
Dominican Rep
Eritrea
France
Germany
Guinea
Hungary
Ireland
Jamaica
Kenya
Latvia
Madagascar
Mauritania
Mongolia
Nepal
Niger
Panama
Philippines
Rwanda
Singapore
Spain
Switzerland
Thailand
Turkey
United Kingdom
Venezuela

Angola
Austria
Belgium
Brazil
Cambodia
Chad
Congo Brazzaville
Cuba
Ecuador
Estonia
Gabon
Ghana
Guinea-Bissau
India
Israel
Japan
Kuwait
Lesotho
Malawi
Mauritius
Morocco
Netherlands
Norway
Papua New Guinea
Poland
Saudi Arabia
Slovak Republic
Sri Lanka
Syria
Togo
Turkmenistan
United States
Zambia

Note: Countries with names in italic are oil producers.
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Argentina
Azerbaijan
Benin
Bulgaria
Cameroon
Chile
Congo Kinshasa
Czech Republic
Egypt
Ethiopia
Gambia
Greece
Haiti
Indonesia
Italy
Jordan
Kyrgyzstan
Lithuania
Malaysia
Mexico
Mozambique
New Zealand
Oman
Paraguay
Portugal
Senegal
Slovenia
Sudan
Tajikistan
Trinidad
Uganda
Uruguay
Zimbabwe
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Mean

Median

Std. Dev. Minimum

Maximum

Leadership turnover
3,588
0.161
0
0.367
0
1
Membership in IGOs
3,588 52
54.20
22.34
1
143
Resource rents (logged)
3,172 12.95
17.91
9.69
0
26.01
GDP per capita (logged)
3,083
7.36
7.23
1.57
4.06
11.02
Economic growth
3,107
3.067
3.569
7.072
−51.030
106.300
Trade/GDP
3,088 68.800
58.450
43.890
1.466
412.20
Government spending/GDP 2,984 16.42
15.40
7.157
2.976
76.220
Democracy (Polity score)
3,550 −0.149
−2
7.592
−10
10
Elected legislature
3,517
1.700
2
0.685
0
2
Finite term
3,494
0.734
1
0.442
0
1
Internal threat
3,497
1.466
0
3.465
0
49
Population (logged)
3,503 15.930
15.870
1.545
11.93
20.94
Leader’s age
3,588 56.6
56
11.591
18
92
Note. The upper block includes the whole sample; the lower block includes oil producers.

N

Table 5.4: Descriptive Statistics for the Sample in Table 5.1
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Chapter 6
Conclusions
This dissertation starts with the discussion of the resource curse theory, pointing
out two issues that deserve more attention: the missing role of foreign actors
and the contradictory findings of regime stability and frequent civil conflicts in
resource rich countries. It then presents a theory that can address these two
issues: the presence of foreign actors in resource rich countries helps the leaders
survive. The theory is built within a framework that separates the leader from the
citizens/opposition, and incorporates different types of foreign actors, especially
a coalition of foreign investors and their home governments. The main argument
is that foreign actors will support the leaders of resource rich countries where
they invest, and a particular form of support is not to support the opposition.
There are two core elements underpinning the theory: Powerful foreign countries take natural resources seriously, and natural resources increase revolutionary
threat. The first fact provides foreign actors the incentives to assist the leaders of
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resource rich countries, and the second fact offers the leaders the incentives to
cooperate with foreign actors. When the leader and foreign actors have this tacit
arrangement of “resource for protection” swap, the opposition has little chance to
challenge, not only because the leader has the money and ability to keep down
the opposition, but also because foreign actors are unlikely to support the opposition. This leads to the hypothesis that a leader of a resource rich country is less
likely to fail if foreign actors are involved in the resource sector.
Using data on political leaders and oil ownership, I show that foreign ownership of oil has a negative effect on leadership turnover, meaning that leaders stay
in power longer. This finding is not subject to the reverse causality problem. I also
use alternative data to measure the level of cooperation with the United States,
including the U.S. mining investment and the U.S. oil import, both of which have
a positive effect on leader length as well. Moreover, to test the mechanisms, I
use data on military intervention, budgetary aid, and IMF assistance, and the
results indicate a positive relationship between foreign ownership of oil and various forms of foreign support. So the big takeaway from this dissertation is that
foreign actors have incentives and do make actual efforts to support the leaders
of the countries in which they have a strategic interest, i.e. natural resources.
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Future research
A question that arises is why we still see oil rich countries not privatizing their
oil to foreign investors even if foreign ownership helps the leader to thrive. While
this dissertation assumes that foreign investors always want to enter resource rich
countries, the theory implies that a leader in face of revolutionary threat or strong
domestic opposition is more likely to privatize natural resources. The evidence
provided in Jones Luong and Weinthal (2010, p. 318) to a certain degree supports
this implication, which shows that oil producing countries that have a higher level
of distributional conflict are more likely to choose private ownership than state
ownership. What determines natural resource ownership, however, is beyond the
scope of this dissertation and needs to be explored in future research.
Moreover, an important assumption in this dissertation is that foreign companies and their home governments have overlapping interests. For some industries,
this assumption may be problematic because the government’s foreign policy and
the private companies’ interests may be divergent.1 In the resource sector, however, this assumption is fairly reasonable because both the governments and their
MNCs care about the cooperation of resource rich countries, which leads to stable profits for the MNCs and resource sustainability for the governments. Also, in
1 For

example, there is a huge literature on trade or FDI discussing MNCs’ ability to lobby or to
engage in political activities and the degree to which they get protected or benefits (e.g., Garland
and Biglaiser, 2009; Hansen and Mitchell, 2000; McGillivray, 2004), which implies that government
policies may not be in line with firms’ interests.
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some IOCs, their home governments are actually the biggest stakeholders, which
guarantees the common interest of both.2
This said, it is likely that foreign companies are privatized (if they were previously state owned) or gain independence from their home governments. It leads
to the question of whether this divergence will lead to different foreign policy
on oil and natural resources or have different effects on the domestic politics of
resource rich countries. So future research may want to relax the assumption of
common interests and investigate the variations within foreign actors.

2 For

instance, there is an increasing scholarly interest in the Chinese outward investment in oil
or mining sectors in African or Central Asian countries. This literature basically assumes that
the Chinese state owned petroleum/resource companies follow the Chinese government’s will
with the support of Beijing (e.g., Andrews-Speed and Vinogradov, 2000; Taylor, 2006; Zweig and
Jianhai, 2005).
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